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Personal Note 
This paper is the end result of a year's study of South Africa's 
foreign policy. In May 1994 Richard Calland and I spent a week in 
Pretoria interviewing members of the Department of Foreign Affairs. 
our paper, "Multilateralism, Southern Africa and the Postmodern 
World", was published through the University of the Western Cape's 
Centre for Southern African studies, and I owe our advisor and 
mentor Peter Vale a special thanks for helping me to think 
critically about South Africa's regional role. 
A second round of interviews in November with members of 
Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs allowed me another look 
inside the policy framework, and confirmed my suspicion that policy 
'information' on foreign affairs has not yet found clear channels 
between government branches in the new South Africa. 
I was extremely fortunate to corner Robert Schrire, who became my 
advisor for this paper, and am especially thankful for our 
conversations and his stimulating insights into the world beyond 
Southern Africa. 
Most importantly, I would like to thank my family, especially my 
parents, for giving me the opportunity to witness a remarkable year 
in South Africa. 
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Introduction 
With the ending of the apartheid regime and the transition to power 
of a government of national unity, South Africa is now a legitimate 
member of the international community. It has joined the 
Organisation of African Unity, the British Commonwealth, and the 
Southern African Development Community, and it is busily fostering 
trade links with Europe, North America, the Far East, and Latin 
America. Its diplomats have worked to mediate conflicts in Angola 
and Mozambique, and its president is widely seen as an 
international statesman and a moral leader of almost unprecedented 
repute. Yet the new· government continues to operate within South 
Africa's traditional international paradigm and has not yet 
developed a unique global role that reflects the country's internal 
"negotiated revolution". 
As a result, substantial challenges face efforts to forge a new 
south African approach to the world. From outside the country, 
forces unleashed by the fall of communism and the rise of a truly 
global marketplace mark a volatile and uncertain transition in 
world history. From the inside, political transition has sparked 
a redefinition of what it means to be South African, but thuis has 
not been reflected in new policies. The Foreign Ministry is widely 
recognised as a bastion of old-guard stalwarts; the ANC and NP have 
done little to reconcile their past international experiences; and. 
the information flow on international political and economic trends 
has barely improved since April 1994, leaving interest groups and 
private citizens in the new democracy generally uninformed and 
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therefore unable to help pressure policy. 
The result is a foreign policy over the past year that has had 
little vision and few cohesive threads, and has left a score of 
unresolved issues. The 'new' South Africa's relations with Cuba and 
China, its policies on illegal immigration, and regional 
development plans are all issues that require visionary, decisive 
leadership but for which none has yet been provided. What energy 
or vision, for example, has South Africa brought to the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) since it joined last August? 
In the global peacekeeping debate, and again with Cuba and China, 
South Africa has made little effort to recognise more pro-active 
roles for which it is well equipped. Why is it not asserting 
itself? Who actually is in charge of its foreign policy? 
Few thus would deny that a paralysis has settled in on South 
African foreign policy. A recent analysis in the Weekly Mail 
lamented, "We are not consistent. We have not formulated clear 
principles. The formulators of our foreign policy do not consult 
with the people. The new appointments to our foreign ministry 
complain of being sidelined. There is no clear break with the 
past". 
At the core of this inaction is the fact that policy makers have 
failed to reconceptualise the way international issues are seen and 
policy is made. The world has changed and South Africa has changed, 
both dramatically; yet Cold War debates still divide the policy 
framework, old style security thinking still dominates higher 
ranks, and most importantly, the growing inter linkages between 
domestic and foreign policies in a post-Cold War world have gone 
largely unheeded. 
It is thus appropriate to sound a note of urgency: change and 
uncertainty in the world and dramatic transformation at home 
combine to make this an inopportune, even dangerous, time to have 
a directionless foreign policy. The broad purpose· of this paper is 
to identify the salient external and internal factors that will 
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drive a new South African approach to the world. The first chapter 
presents a synthesis of dominant global trends, and sets them 
against the backdrop of major structural changes in international 
relations. The second chapter discusses change in South Africa in 
relation to world changes, new state objectives and shifting 
interest groups, and considers these implications for three major 
foreign policy areas. The third chapter looks at the policy 
framework and the ability of policy makers to conceptualise these 
dual changes and to formulate effective policies. The final chapter 
offers a 'road map' of policy options towards a true post-
apartheid, post-Cold War foreign policy. 
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CHAPTER I 
------------------------------------------------------- -----------
some Trends in the New World order 
I. Interpreting the post-Cold war world 
World politics have gone through significant changes since the 
Berlin Wall crumbled in 1989 and the Cold War came to an end. Geo-
political power blocs have ceased to dominate international 
relations and the position of nation-states in the international 
system as traditionally understood is increasingly the subject of 
debate. Transnational forces are more and more at the core of the 
international landscape and there is little doubt that the world 
is a more complex place than it was 50 or even 20 years ago. 
"Democracy", Larry Diamond writes, "has won the great ideological 
struggle of the Cold War" and the "extinction of global communism 
has created an epochal opportunity to restructure world politics" . 1 
This 'extinction' though, has left open a door to uncertainty. Most 
observers agree that a new understanding of the world needs to be 
articulated. But there is disagreement as to what exactly needs to 
be understood, or more precisely, what it is that should be 
included, or not, in such an understanding. Are states still the 
fundamental actors in global politics? Where do the changing 
movements of capital and people fit into this understanding? What 
about the 'global economic community'? And what of the world's 
1Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy", Foreign Policy, 
Summer 1992; p. 25. 
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growing inequalities, both in and between societies? Though most 
would concur with Diamond that the fall of communism has produced 
"a multipolar, fluid, and volatile world in which regimes, 
ideologies, identities and national boundaries will experience 
vigorous change and contestation", what is less clear is how 
dramatic our current juncture actually is. 2 After all, fluidity and 
changing identities have to some extent always characterised 
international relations. 
II. Major Global Trends 
One commentator writes that "everyone with an interest in 
international affairs must be aware that broad, global forces for 
change are bearing down upon humankind in both rich and poor 
societies alike". 3 What are these forces, what changes in world 
politics do they signal, and what kind of new world are they 
shaping? 
1. The Widespread Acceptance of Democracy 
Democracy and democratic principles have gained unprecedented 
exposure and acceptance in recent years. Freedom House rated 75 
countries as politically "free" at the end of 1991, 10 more than 
a year earlier and nearly twice as many since 1971. 4 With the fall 
of international communism, democracy is increasingly the most 
attractive option for societies in transition. The values of 
political, economic and civil freedom are rapidly becoming the 
internationally accepted as "correct". 
2 
'b'd 25 ]. ]. ., p. . 
3 Kennedy, "Preparing for the 21st Century", The New York 
Review, Feb. 11, 1993; p. 32. Condensed from Kennedy, Preparing 
for the Twenty-First Century, Random House, 1993. 
4 Diamond, "Promoting Democracy", 1992; p. 25. 
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Democracy, many argue, should be supported for its moral and 
intellectual qualifications. Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour 
Martin Lipset in their work on developing countries maintain: 
"If there were many undemocratic governments (now and in the 
past) committed to serving collective goals, rather than the 
interests of the rulers, and ready to respect human rights we 
might find these questions (criticisms) more difficult to 
answer. However, no undemocratic regime meets these two 
requirements, and even those that began with.· a strong 
ideological commitment to the collectivity and a professed 
sensitivity to human rights became increasingly narrow, 
autocratic and repressive". 5 
On practical grounds also, democracy is in vogue. With the current 
trend toward political freedom and basic civil liberties, non-
democratic regimes are increasingly marginalised by the world 
political economy. Ultimately, democracy is desired for itself. 
"Throughout the world", Diamond argues, "people have come through 
bitter experience, to a new appreciation of political freedom and 
constitutionalism as ends in themselves". 6 
But this 'democratic moment' does not appear to be the "end of 
history". Other alternatives authoritarianism, Islamic 
fundamentalism, ultranationalism - still attract. Moreover, the 
roots of democracy in much of the world are alarmingly shallow, and 
many new "democracies 11 sustain only rudimentary ins ti tut ions. 
Elected officials often lack effective control over the civil 
service and the military. Legal and judicial systems are weak and 
lack training, resources and authority. And fundamentally, civil 
societies in new democracies are notoriously weak, often in 
confusion and disarray following a transition. Absent in many cases 
is a shared commitment to democracy by the elites and citizens, a 
variety of autonomous civic organisations and civil groups, and an 
independent pluralist media, which together comprise the 
5 Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lips et, 
Politics in Developing countries, Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 
1990; p. 3. 
6 Diamond, "Promoting Democracy", 1992; p. 26. 
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infrastructural backbone of a democracy. 7 Democracy as an ideal may 
have been victorious but democracy as a viable system is far from 
a universal reality. 
Of the more than 40 countries that have made democratic transitions 
since 1973, only a handful, among them Greece, Portugal and Spain, 
can be described as stable and fully consolidated. 8 About one third 
have experienced "either the complete breakdown of democracy or 
substantial deterioration of civil liberties and peaceful electoral 
competition". 9 
Democracy in much of the world is threatened by economic and social 
crisis. In Africa these crises are acute. According to the World 
Bank, every region of the world is likely to experience a reduction 
in poverty by the year 2000, except Africa. Interweaving 
combinations of overpopulation, poor productivity, political 
instability and military conflict, superimposed on a colonial 
legacy that has never really been shaken, plague the continent. 
Africa's population growth, for example, at about 2. 6% in the 
1960's, rose to over 3% by the late 1980's, entailing a doubling 
in size every 22 years, giving it the highest growth rate of any 
region in the world. This trend, furthermore is unlikely to be 
reversed, as it. was in the Far East, in the short or medium term. 
Sodial and cultural attitudes toward family size remain deeply 
embedded, and according to one poll of African women, "desired 
family size" ranges from five to nine children. 10 
The experiences of two African countries, which at one time 
appeared to be the continent's democratic beacons, indicate how 
unstable democratic institutions can be in countries facing severe 
economic and social problems; and, in turn, show just how fragile 
7 
"b'd J. J. • I p. 26. 
8 
'b'd J. J. • I p. 26. 
9 
'b'd J. J. • I p.26. 
1° Kennedy, "Preparing for the 21st Century", 1993; p. 40. 
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are claims that democracy's recent push forward is irreversible. 
The story of Nigeria's First and Second Republics are textbook 
examples of how bloated bureaucracy, unaccountable government, and 
corruption can doom democracy. Both of the military coups that 
toppled Nigeria' republics, the first in 1966 and the second in 
1983, were precipitated by an array of power abuses by the 
government that centred on corruption and repression of the 
opposition. From 1979 to 1983, "scandals involving billions of 
dollars dominated the headlines". 11 Ranging from illicit auctions 
and fraudulent import-export transactions, there was a sense that 
"politics was out of control". 12 Al though corruption exists in all 
forms of government, democracy, particularly in its infancy, makes 
it less easily disguised and thus more politically explosive. 
Zimbabwe's experience is not dissimilar. Corruption is prevalent 
and, as in Nigeria, this has weakened grassroots confidence in the 
democratic system. ZANU(PF) has ruled Zimbabwe since independence 
in 1980 and has dominated a political culture that, "despite its 
appreciation in principle for democratic institutions, bears the 
scars of the intolerant, violent and commandist culture of the 
liberation struggle" . 13 President Mugabe has led the country 
steadily away from functioning democracy, systematically repressing 
opposition from the Matabeleland crisis in 1982-83, through a 
decade (1980-1990) of emergency powers, to the current dominance, 
as the April 1995 elections showed, of a de facto one-party state. 
Many have argued that the West's insistence on democracy in the 
Third World has obscured the real needs of developing countries. 
Singapore's former Prime Minister Lee Quan Yew ( 1950-1990), who 
oversaw his country's shift from poverty to prosperity, sometimes 
with an iron-grip, recently gave this advice to African leaders: 
Do not "follow mindlessly the present politically correct and 
11 George B.N. Ayittey, Africa Betrayed, .New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1992; p. 250. 
12 • b'd 1 1 •I P• 250. 
0 Sithole in Diamond, Linz and Lipset, 1990; p. 18. 
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stridently advocated view that democracy is the precondition for 
economic development ... What is necessary for growth and progress 
is good government, one that is honest and effective and works for 
the benefit of the people. This includes the pursuit of national 
interest regardless of theories or ideologies".~ 
Nominally this is good advice. But the alternatives to democracy 
lead overwhelmingly to disaster, especially, the record shows, in 
Africa. What is clear at this turning point is that each country's 
democratic development, with its inevitable coughs and hiccups, has 
unique dynamics and requirements which cannot be moulded to a 
universal model. In particular, the 'second liberation' of Africa 
will largely depend on how well new efforts at democracy reach the 
core of African experiences. 15 
The Declining Influence of the state 
Individual states are wielding diminishing influence on the 
international stage. Goods and services, crime and disease, 
information and capital, all cross borders more frequently and 
rapidly than ever before, making the world a smaller place and 
breaking down barriers between people. 
Some observers say that we are entering a "postmodern" era of 
international politics. Columbia University's John Ruggie suggests 
that new "institutional, juridical and spatial complexes" are 
replacing the traditional state-oriented understanding of 
international relations . 16 Others like Robert Kaplan see 
postmodernism as the 'globalisation' of problems like AIDS, global 
14 Lee Quan Yew, "Lessons for Africa in Asian Success Story", 
Weekend Argus, January 14, 1995; p. 17. 
15 Larry Diamond, "The New Wind", Africa Report, Sept. /Oct. 
1994; p. 51. 
16 John Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality and beyond: 
problematizing modernity in international relations", 
International Organization, 47, 1, Winter 1993, p. 140. 
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warming, and the transnational drug trade. 17 Whether or not 
postmodernism matures into a theory of international relations, one 
of its most important messages is abundantly clear: the state's 
monopoly on international relations is being destroyed. 
Nonetheless, the state is far from irrelevant. As one analyst 
points out: "Only the state can defend corporate interests in 
international negotiations over trade, investment, and market 
access ... If the existence of the state is in doubt, just ask the 
depositors of BCCI in some fifty countries who woke up one morning 
to find their accounts frozen" . 18 Indeed, states still dominate the 
international system and are the only actors capable of 
legitimising changes including pacts, treaties and economic 
arrangements. Another form of organisation has yet to challenge the 
state and empirical evidence shows, as Ethan Kapstein argues, that 
many firms "continue to value their national identity, since only 
the state can assist them in international negotiations over such 
issues as market access and regulation" . 19 People also continue to 
"need a sovereign state of their own to cling to as children do a 
teddy bear" . 20 National politicians do the same: "They welcome, in 
theory, the new open-market consensus across the world. They balk, 
in practice, at what it means for their own roles". 21 
But, unquestionably, the state's dominance is declining. An 
17 Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy: How scarcity, 
crime, overpopulation, tribalism and disease are rapidly 
destroying the social fabric of our planet", Atlantic Monthly, 
February 1994. 
18 Ethan Kapstein, "We are US: The myth of the 
multinational", The National Interest, Winter 1991/1992; pp. 55 
and 61. 
19 Ethan Kapstein, letter to the editor, "Territoriality and 
Who is "US"?", International Organization, 47, 3, Summer.1993; 
p. 502. 
20 Nico Colchester, "The slow death of the nation-state", The 
Economist, Special issue, "The world in 1995", January 1995; p. 
15. 
21 • b. d 1 1 • I P • 15 • 
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alternative has not yet emerged, and the state may find various 
ways of adapting, but many other forces now affect transnational, 
cross-cultural relations. Paul Kennedy puts it best when he says 
that "these various trends from global warming to twenty-four-hour-
a-day trading are transnational in character, crossing borders all 
over our planet, affecting local communities and distant societies 
at the same time, and reminding us that the earth, for all of its 
divisions, is a single unit.n 
2. The Global Market Economy 
A second important trend is the emergence of a global market 
economy. Trade and investment issues are filling the agendas of 
most countries' foreign relations and are creating new links 
between peoples and societies. The fall of communism, and with it 
the declining risk of warfare between the world's major states, has 
given new emphasis to economic relations. Economic power is now the 
'big stick' brandished on the international stage; and 
interdependence gives this stick its sting. 
At the forefront of these trends is the extraordinary capacity of 
technology to transform economic and political relationships. "New 
technologies", one commentator writes, are challenging traditional 
assumptions about the way we make, trade, and even grow things". 23 
Technology has, another says, 
inexorably generated the phenomenon of 'globalization', that 
is the linkage of common human interests over the whole 
planet, an now also over outer space.~ 
Communication systems, the latest computer software, transportation 
22 Kennedy, "Preparing for the 21st Century", 1993; ~· 32. 
23 ibid. I P• 32 • 
24 Ghita Ionescu, Leadership in an Interdependent World: The 
Statesmanship of Adenauer, de Gaulle, Thatcher, Reaqan and 
Gorbachev, Harlow, England: Longman Group, 1991; p. 4. 
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innovations, all affect the daily transactions of billions of 
people worldwide. An immediate "and almost universal result" of 
these technological advances has been to "unify national markets 
for all other goods and services". 25 Producers now produce not for 
a single national market but for a global market and new means of 
communication allow buyers and sellers to access information on 
world market trends. It is likely that the capacity of countries 
to tap.into this quickly moving world of technology will largely 
determine their global position in the coming decades. 
This accelerating rate of technological change is linked to several 
other factors, which together herald a structural change in the 
world political economy: the "internationalisation of production" 
and the spread of manufacturing industry to several newly 
industrialised countries (NIC' s) ; increased capital mobility, which 
has made this dispersion easier and quicker; and a change in the 
"structure" of power which benefits those with know-how and access 
to 'information'. Together these have made transnational 
communication fast, cheap and effective and have raised global 
awareness of the benefits of the market economy. 26 Says Susan 
strange: 
"These common roots have resulted, at the same time and in 
many countries, in the demand for democratic government and 
for the economic flexibility that is impossible in a command 
economy". 27 
But these trends in the world economy will mean different things 
to different states. For industrialised economies like the United 
states, Japan, the EU and the Asian Tigers, technological advance 
will bolster and perhaps increase their economic superiority. With 
their funds for research and development, their high education 
levels, and their head start, they may prove uncatchable for at 
25 Susan Strange, States and Markets, London: Pinter 
Publishers, 1988; p. 127. 
~ibid., p. 127. 
27 Susan Strange, "States, Firms, 
International Affairs, January 1992; p. 2. 
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and Diplomacy", 
least several decades. For those countries in Latin America, 
Africa, Asia, and the former Soviet bloc that are still struggling 
to develop and to sustain nascent political transitions, the global 
economy will provide few bonuses. 
With the demise of gee-political alliances, developing countries 
will probably find it more difficult than in the past to win 
friends and garner international support. With the major criterion 
in relations between states and people now shifting to economic and 
trade issues, poorer countries may have less and less to offer 
their partners in a world without competing ideologies - and thus 
will be increasingly left to themselves to "catch up". A few 
observations confirm this likelihood. First, one cannot really talk 
of a dual global economy anymore, divided between developed and 
developing countries. With the rise of the NIC's and several other 
countries including Brazil, India, Mexico and Turkey, there are an 
increasing number of shades to the world economic hierarchy. These 
changes have complicated North-South relations, with the so-called 
Third World no longer a front of developing countries lined up 
against the rich ones. Writes one scholar, "developing countries 
are now acutely aware that they are competing against each other, 
the laggards desperately trying to catch up with the successful 
newly industrialized countries". 28 
Another illustration sharpens this picture. In the 1960's, South 
Korea had a per capita GNP exactly the same as Ghana's ($230). Both 
had experienced several decades or more of colonial rule, and 
possessed a primarily agrarian economy. Yet today South Korea is 
entering the ranks of the rich nations, its GNP per capita ten to 
twelve times that of Ghana's, which remains mired in one of the 
world's most poverty-stricken regions. With countries like South 
Korea trickling into the ranks of the rich, fully developed 
countries may not any time soon be "forced" to deal with the 
poorest countries on their terms, as had once been hoped. "It is 
no accident", concludes Strange, "that the 'dependency school' 
28 • b. d 4 1 1 ., p .. 
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writers of the 1970's have lost so much of their audience". 29 
Differentiation in the global economy is also sharpened by the 
formation of regional trading blocks. With the most advanced states 
forming joint economic arrangements - NAFTA, the EC, and ASEAN -
the poorest nations may find it even more difficult to break out 
of their developing quagmire. Even the newly created International 
Trade Organisation (ITO) is seen to mostly benefit advanced 
countries. 
The rise of a global market economy is linked to the spread of 
democracy and a growing respect worldwide for economic, political 
and social freedom. But like the democratic movement, the global 
marketplace will mean different things to different countries, and 
its benefits will be spread unevenly. It remains to be seen whether 
the poorest countries will achieve any gain in absolute terms. What 
is clear though, is that new trends in the world economy favor 
those countries that are already high in the pecking order. 
International Power in the Information Age 
As the spread of democracy and the market economy suggest, power 
on the international stage is changing. Military might no longer 
carries the same influence that it used to. As the threat of 
warfare between the major states declines, the high cost of 
military readiness and deployment among the advanced countries is 
less and less necessary on the scale it was during the Cold War. 
International political issues are increasingly tied to economic 
factors. 
At the heart of this change is what some call the Information 
29 'b'd 1 1 ., p. 4. 
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Revolution. 30 Just as factory production and the spread of 
electricity and chemistry twice revolutionised trade and commerce 
in the past two hundred years, so in the past few decades has the 
spread and use of 'information'. Computers, telecommunications, 
satellites all transmit the latest information to anyone, anywhere 
who can use it and who knows what to do with it - in a world 
dominated by economies and trade, 'knowledge' rather than military 
brawn may be the surest way to wield 'power'. "Power", writes Susan 
strange, is even passing to the "information rich" instead of the 
"capital-rich". "Indeed", she says, "it is information that unlocks 
the door giving access to credit, not the mere possession and 
accumulation of capital in whatever form". 31 
Economic and political implications follow from these changes in 
the 'power structure'. Economically, white-collar service jobs have 
replaced manufacturing jobs the way manufacturing jobs once 
replaced those in agriculture. This is most apparent in the U.S. 
where by 1984, 72% of people employed outside agriculture were in 
service jobs as compared to 62% in 1960. Even more telling is that 
between 1982-1984, 69% of new jobs created in the U.S. were in 
service i!1dustries. 32 Though it is true that most of these new 
service jobs have been in low-paying occupations like fast-foods, 
retail, and tourism, the overall trend is unmistakeable. Firms are 
now spending more and more on service and information related 
hardware to keep apace, large non-information firms are 
diversifying into the information sector and perhaps most 
important, as one analyst says, "the value to a firm of its 
employees in service jobs is enhanced at the expense of its old 
industrial workers". 33 
30 Joseph s. Nye, Jr. , Bound To Lead, Harper Co 11 ins 
Publishers, 1990; p. 8. 
31
· strange, states and Markets, 1988; p. 134. 
n ibid., p. 128. 
33 ibid., p. 128; Strange suggests the large American 
aircraft manufacturers, Boeing, Lockheed, and McDonnel Douglas 
as examples. 
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Politically, technological innovations have centralised power in 
big transnational corporations (TNC's) that have the ability and 
financing to 'internationalise' information. TNC's, entrepreneurs, 
and the businesspeople of the international marketplace are the 
immediate beneficiaries of the 'Information Revolution'. They 
increasingly wield power over markets and firms in less advanced 
countries and often over weak governments themselves. In fact, the 
extraordinary influence of TNC's, Susan strange argues, has helped 
reconsolidate international power in the United states where 40% 
of the world's largest TNC's are headquartered. 
Washington may have lost some of its authority over the us-
based transnationals, but their managers still carry US 
passports, can be subpoenaed in us courts, and in war or 
national emergency would obey Washington first. Meanwhile, the 
us government has gained new authority over a great many 
foreign corporations operating inside tne United States. All 
of them are acutely aware that the US market is the biggest 
prize. 34 
When measured against its predominance in the "knowledge 
structure", argues Strange, "any loss of American capability in 
industrial manufacturing is trivial and unimportant"." 
As with the state system, the change in international power has a 
lot to do with the growing complexity of world politics. Military 
might may still be important but it is now one of many power 
sources, and increasingly is not the most effective. International 
political issues today rarely place one state against another; they 
are rather issues "in which all states try to control nonstate 
transnational actors". 36 As Joseph Nye says: 
new power sources, such as the capacity for effective 
communication and for developing and using multilateral 
institutions, may prove more relevant. Moreover, cooperation 
will often be required from small, weak states not fully 
capable of managing their own domestic drug, health, or 
34 ibid., p. 131. 
"ibid., p. 133. 
~ Nye, Bound to Lead, 1990, p. 186. 
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0 
ecological problems.n 
Regardless though of the trend toward multilateralism, it is clear 
that those societies, whether American, Asian or European, that are 
well placed to offer their citizens advanced education and training 
in new technologies will become, or remain, the primary nodes of 
global influence. Consider that for every million citizens in 
Japan, there are 3,548 scientists and engineers, in the United 
States, 2, 685, but in Africa only 54 per million. 38 This supports, 
sadly, the cliche that already advanced societies will advance more 
rapidly and disadvantaged societies will fall further behind. 
3. The Changing Pattern of Global Conflict 
A third major trend is the changing pattern of global conflict. 
Wars between states are now rare, in part because economic power, 
as exemplified by Japan's ascendence, is now a more effective and 
lasting means of achieving national objectives than military 
power. 39 "Territorial aggression", one observer puts it, "is no 
longer a cost effective way to acquire wealth". In addition, 
international norms have changed heavily against military force. 
"The ideology that saw virtue, nobility, and glory in war, has all 
but disappeared in the advanced industrialised countries". 40 
What has risen however, is the frequency of wars within states -
intrastate conflict. Throughout the "zone of conflict", which 
includes the former Soviet bloc, most of sub-Saharan Africa, and 
parts of Latin America and South Asia, state governments are being 
increasingly challenged, often violently, by their own citizens. 
Government corruption, economic and social crises, scarcity of 
37 ibid. I P• 187 • 
38 Kennedy, "Preparing for the 21st Century0 1 1993; p. 40. 
39 Gareth Evans, "Cooperative Security and Intra State 
Conflict", Foreign Policy, Fall 1994; p. 4. 
40 
'b'd 4 l. l. ., p .. 
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common resources, environmental deterioration, have all led, often 
in combination, to intractable internal conflict. Writes Gareth 
Evans, Australia's Foreign Minister and a member of the Carnegie 
Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, "economic decline has 
hastened the process of national disintegration, and vice versa. 
The combination has led in extreme cases to the "failed state" 
syndrome evident in Rwanda, Somalia, and elsewhere". 41 
In one view, the "zone of conflict" is entering an "epoch of 
themeless juxtapositions in which the classificatory grid of 
nation-states is going to be replaced by a jagged-glass pattern of 
city-states, shanty-states, (and) nebulous and anarchic 
regionalisms". 42 Crime, lawlessness, and the general breakdown of 
government, the author says, are what makes West Africa a "natural 
point of departure" for his report on the planet's political 
character in the twenty-first century. 
In Africa and other parts of the former colonial world, intrastate 
conflict is a function of the global divide between developed and 
developing worlds. Fledgling governments are faced with lingering 
colonial legacies that include artificial geographical boundaries, 
poor education, training, and productive capacities, and are often 
forced to make severe economic tradeoff s to remain afloat in the 
international economy. The downward economic spiral faced by many 
poor countries is directly linked to an increase in internal 
strife. In almost every case of major intrastate violence, from the 
former Soviet republics to Rwanda, ethnic and religious conflict 
has been associated with "significant periods of declining per 
capita gross national product, the rise of demagogic politics, and 
the intensification of chauvinistic myth making". 43 With the 
economic decline of many struggling states, Evans says, "there is 
little evidence that violent intrastate conflict is likely to 
41 • b. d 4 1 1 ., p •• 
42 Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy", 1994; p. 72. 
43 Evans, "Cooperative Security and Intra State Conflict, 
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decrease of its own accord in the near or mid-term future".~ 
One final observation helps explain the rise of intrastate 
conflict: about 40% of the world's states have five or more sizable 
ethnic populations; merely 
homogenous. 45 The artificial 
20% are 
boundaries 
relatively 
in much of 
ethnically 
the post-
colonial wprld make 'nation-state' a curious term. Long-standing 
political communities are divided by often arbitrary boundaries, 
making multistate nations and multination states more prevalent 
than nation-states.~ 
One vision of a world no longer dominated by nation-states is the 
rise of conflict between major civilizations. In a bold article, 
"The Clash of Civilizations", Samuel Huntington argues that 
competing civilizations - Western, Japanese, Confucian, Hindu, 
Islamic, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African -
will form the new fault lines of global conflict. 47 As nation-
states fade away, the argument goes, civilizations will come in 
greater contact with one another, breeding resentment and 
antagonism and leading to hostility. "Culture, not class, ideology 
or even nationality will differentiate the contending power blocs 
of the future". 48 
But Huntington's theory raises more questions than it answers. Why 
would different cultural values necessarily lead to political and 
military confrontation? Or, how likely would it be for long-time 
enemies like Iraq, Iran and Syria to unite against the West? 
Huntington's argument is only a slightly disguised form of 
political realism; for him, states have been replaced by 
~ ibid., p. 5. 
45 ibid. I p. 5. 
46 ibid., p. 5. 
47 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations", 
Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993. 
48 Richard Rubenstein and Jarle Crocker, "Challenging 
Huntington", Foreign Policy, Fall 1994; p. 114. 
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civilizations which engage, as states once did, in a struggle for 
power, each trying to advance its own interests in an anarchic 
setting. 49 With transnational forces binding people across the 
globe in various complex ways, sweeping generalizations about wars 
between civilizations may be imprecise. Conflict in the future will 
probably have more diffuse origins than in the past; and if the 
global economy continues to grow, leaving many behind, economic 
decay may become a more frequent catalyst for conflict. 
New Approaches to security 
These changing patterns of global conflict are inspiring new 
approaches to security. Kaplan's 'epoch of themeless 
juxtapositions' suggests a world in which the "complexity and 
fluidity of economic, political, and social forces transcend 
traditional nation-state based paradigms". so Put simply, Cold War 
ideas about protecting the physical and political integrity of 
states are becoming obsolete. 
Increasing transnational crime, lawlessness, refugee flows, drug-
running, etc., as well as cross-border trade and investment, means 
that security may be more multi-dimensional in character than in 
the past. International security now demands attention "not only 
to political and diplomatic issues but also to such factors as 
economic underdevelopment, trade disputes, and human rights 
abuses". Sl The U. N. 's founders, for instance, envisioned a system 
of 'collective security', in which the member body of nations acted 
as a deterrent to aggression by any other state. In recent years 
this emphasis on deterrence has shifted to prevention; in short, 
Gareth Evans says, "achieving security with others, not against 
49 
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"' 
them". 52 
Linked to this movement toward a more cooperative, comprehensive 
approach to international security is new thinking on who or what 
exactly needs protection. "Security", Evans suggests, "is as much 
about the protection of individuals as it is about the defense of 
the territorial integrity of states". 53 In this view, threats to 
'human security', which is violated on a huge scale in intrastate 
conflict', can be deemed an 'international security issue' by a 
body such as the U.N. Former U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez 
de Cuellar was among the first to express this view when he 
remarked in 1991 that the traditional prerogatives of state 
sovereignty needed to be reassessed in light of "the shift in 
public attitudes towards the belief that the defense of the 
oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and 
legal documents" . 54 
As the international uncertainty over the conflicts in Bosnia, 
Rwanda and Somalia shows, practical applications of this thinking 
have been difficult. What is clear is that transnational forces are 
making states and peoples view their security in less unilateral 
terms. 
The case of West African refugee movements illustrates, in an 
extreme way, the collapse of nation-state borders. "There is no 
place on the planet where political maps are so deceptive - where, 
in fact, they tell such lies - as in West Africa", writes Robert 
Kaplan. 55 Governments in the region are only marginally in control 
of what is happening in each state. About 400,000 Sierra Leonians 
are internally displaced, 280,000 have fled to neighbouring 
Guineau, 100,000 have fled to Liberia, even as 400,000 Liberians 
52 ibid. ' p. 7. 
53 ibid.' p. 9. 
54 ibid. ' p. 8. 
55 Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy", 1994; P· 46. 
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have fled to Sierra Leone. With an additional 600,000 Liberians in 
Guineau and 250,000 in the Ivory Coast, the borders dividing these 
countries, says Kaplan, "have become largely meaningless". 56 Even 
for richer societies in North America and Europe, migrant flows 
pose social, political and economic problems. They reinforce the 
idea that "we are all in it together", and ultimately that richer 
countries ignore poorer ones at their own peril. 
III. Concluding Thoughts 
With international power now more diffuse competition among states 
and regions will be ruthless. Ironically, at the same time that 
political pluralism and technology are binding distant peoples 
together, the market economy is creating fierce competition and 
divisions between them. South Africa has little control over these 
forces, or over the rules that govern world trade, and like other 
weak states it will thus have to compete or fall further behind. 
Where in the past gee-political alliances provided them with 
military and economic protection, poor countries will now be 
increasingly left on their own to develop and secure themselves, 
even as the richer countries with their technological headstart, 
higher educational levels and stable political economies push 
further ahead. 
But all is not lost for weak states. Constraining as it sometimes 
is, the global economy also provides openings and opportunities. 
Taking advantage of these may require making tradeoffs - supporting 
some industries at the expense of others, welcoming foreigners at 
the expense of locals, for example - but states like South Korea 
and Singapore, and to a degree, Brazil and Mexico, show that 
progress can be made. Ultimately, the bottom line for any 
development success may be something as simple -·and elusive - as 
56 'b'd 1 1 ., p. 46. 
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Lee Quan Yew's notion of "good government". 
Above all, transnational forces are re-arranging the way we think 
about the world. The end of the Cold War, the rise of the global 
marketplace, and new patterns of conflict all herald a new era in 
global politics - one in which interdependence reigns, however 
unclearly. For the policy maker, this points - crucially and 
inexorably - toward a greater linkage between foreign and domestic 
affairs. 
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CHAPTER II 
A Menu of critical Choices 
I. The "Double Whammy" 
As these global forces of change bear down upon South Africa, what 
are the country's options? What kind of identities will it seek 
on the global, continental and regional stages? What state 
objectives will it pursue? Which interests and pressure groups will 
come to bear on foreign policy? How will policy makers balance 
these competing interests? 
As South Africa moves through its early stages of domestic 
transition, these are the questions that confront policy makers as 
they decide which face - or faces - to put on South Africa's post-
apartheid foreign policy. This chapter seeks to provide a framework 
for understanding which interests and objectives will influence 
foreign policy making on several key issues. It is based on the 
recognition that foreign policy makers face a "double whammy" in 
coming to terms with the transformations underway in both the world 
and in South Africa. 57 "The implications of either transformation, 
57 Roger Southall, "The New South Africa in the New· World 
Order: Beyond the double whammy", Third World Quarterly, Vol 15, 
No 1, 1994. Though Southall's initial comparison was made before 
South Africa's April elections and refers to the difficulty of 
assessing "the causes, depth, and likely outcomes of the internal 
changes", the comparison still maintains its poignance in the 
early stages of the government of national unity. 
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taken alone", Roger Southall says, "are themselves subject to 
enormous controversy and debate; taken together, they plunge the 
unfortunate analyst into the midst of an earthquake, struggling to 
negotiate a route towards a safe destination when both walls and 
floor are moving .. 11 • 9 
II. state Objectives and competing Interests 
With the end of minority rule in South Africa, the government is 
finally a legitimate actor. It is now in a position to pursue, for 
the first time, truly 'national' goals. 
The April 1994 mandate however, offers little more direction than 
'reconstruction and development'. Such vague and long-term goals 
require specific policies, and these in turn are fought over by 
competing interests. As is the nature of a democracy, these 
conflicts will prevent the state from always pursuing consistent 
policies. Trade liberalisation have different consequences for 
consumers and producers; Armscor will advocate a different kind of 
regional security from former ANC exiles; trade unions will resist 
privatisation while international investors will resist 
nationalisation; some will vehemently oppose relations with Cuba 
while others will equally strongly support them. 
"Like most societies in this time of global transition", writes 
Peter Vale, "South Africa has not a single, but multiple 
personality traits - many old, just as many new - to the identity 
it seeks". 59 These traits will be competing with one another for 
dominance. Will South Africa turn primarily towards Europe and the 
West or will it now face toward its own continent? Will its First 
World standards shine through or will it slip into Third World 
stagnation? Will it become an international tourist destination or 
58 • b 'd 1 1 • t P • 121. 
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a hub for the transnational drug trade and crime? 
Most indications suggest that the new South Africa will be a mix, 
as Vale suggests, of many, not always compatible, characteristics. 
The real .question it seems is how these various traits will be 
organised - and understood - by those charged with creating a new 
South African approach to the world. 
So far, little ordering has been done. The government's indecision 
over the "two Chinas" issue, discussed later, is a case in point. 
In large measure, post-apartheid foreign policy has reflected the 
confusion that South Africans feel about their collective identity, 
and this highlights an important assumption in this paper: that 
real debates about foreign policy - framed in a post-apartheid, 
post-Cold War, even postmodern, matrix - have yet to begin. How, 
for example, is one to understand the foreign policy of a country 
which, at one and the same time, is committed to controlling 
arms but whose only competitive edge, so its people are being 
told, seems to be in the weapons industry? ... or which relied 
on its neighbours to deliver it from oppression but threatens 
to turn on an electric fence to keep them out?". 60 
In common with other countries in the midst of dramatic 
transformations, South Africa is struggling to escape the legacy 
of its past. Policy and policy thinking will not always be quick 
to change, especially in the absence ·of strong guiding visions. 
Security issues, regional development, and links with the global 
economy will arguably be the major areas of importance, and debate, 
in South Africa's foreign policy. How these issues are approached 
and which interests emerge will largely determine the direction, 
and vision, of post-apartheid foreign policy. 
III. What Kind of Security and for Whom? 
As the previous chapter suggests, different patterns at work in the 
60 
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world are challenging traditional thinking about 'security'. 
Especially in the developing world, security now depends as much 
on the socio-economic and political stability of societies as on 
the absence of external dangers. 
This does not mean however, that traditional security dilemmas have 
al together disappeared or that conventional forces are unnecessary. 
In some respects, a 'middle power' like South Africa may have a 
greater defence burden than in the past. In the post bi-polar 
world, small and medium powers are no longer 'free riders' on the 
backs of larger ones. They will be left increasingly to fend for 
themselves in a world where enemies and friends are less certain. 
For such states, weighing guns against butter may now be more 
difficult than it was during the Cold War. It is no longer clear 
what kind of defence resources are needed and what conventional 
systems are appropriate. In South Africa, for example, what are the 
social welfare tradeof f s of the cost of four navy patrol corvettes 
at about R2.5 billion? The response of a Defence Ministry 
spokesperson indicates the uncertainty of the times: 
If we look at it in the short term, of course we should go for 
houses. But if we look at the long term, security is 
important. 61 
Security against whom or what? When? 
Nonetheless, with the demise of the strategic issues of the Cold 
War, and the declining frequency of wars between states, threats 
to human and national security will be more and more linked to the 
consequences of social and economic decay. The new array of 
destabilising forces are transnational in character: crime, 
disease, drug rings, gun-running, terrorism, and the like defy 
political and national borders. These new threats to security 
represent the dark side of a world hurtling toward greater 
interdependencies. The probles of one country thu·s become also the 
61 
"Modise' s gunboats are heading for rough seas", The Weekly 
Mail, January 13, 1995; p. 3. 
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problems of its neighbours. 
This concept of security has particular relevance for south Africa. 
None of its neighbours are hostile and its own citizens no longer 
fear a repressive, authoritarian state. Now, human life and 
effective government are most threatened by illegal immigration, 
weapons proliferation, the rapid spread of crime, the drug trade, 
AIDS, environmental stress, and general social and economic 
instability both at home and in neighbouring states. Understanding 
security in these terms requires recognising that 11 internal and 
external sources of insecurity are inextricably bound-up; 
disentangling them is impossible". 62 
Appreciating this, it would 
traditional security thinking 
seem, is a major 
in South Africa. 
departure from 
As Peter Vale 
suggests, the post-apartheid security culture still sees the region 
in 'onslaught' terms, as something to be kept at arms length.~ 
The DFA, according to most indications, remains largely "statist", 
understanding international and particularly regional issues as 
interactions between states, rather than between people. More 
crucially, the Defence Ministry appears even more 'old guard'. The 
new Minister, Joe Modise, is seen as a 'hawk' and as Africa 
Confidential recently reported, "is fast becoming as effective an 
advocate for the military as former defence minister Magnus 
Malan".M 'Hawkish' thinking appears to-bode poorly for any attempt 
to confront South Africa's, and the region's, security needs. 
"Creating real security", Vale says, "relies less and less on the 
traditional apparatus of war and more and more on the many faces 
of exchange and interchange. No longer are arms or alms necessary: 
communality of purpose promises a great deal more". 65 
62 Vale, "Of Laagers, Lepers and Leanness", 1994; p. 16. 
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Several sets of statistics show how intertwined are the region's 
countries (and peoples) and their security needs. At the core of 
the regionwide security dilemma is socio-economic decay: this, 
ultimately, is why new visions about security must begin with 
development. Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to have the highest 
incidence of poverty in the world by the year 2000. Related to this 
is the increase in HIV infection, which already threatens to 
overwhelm health services not just in South Africa, but in the 
whole sub-continent, as the infections of the 1980s translate into 
full-blown illnesses in the 1990s.M At least 250,000 South 
Africans were HIV positive by the end of 1992~; 311,000 according 
to other reports.u In four Southern African countries - Angola, 
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe almost one-fifth of the 
populations are estimated to be HIV positive. 69 In the context of 
migration flows and population growth the possibilities are 
horrific. 
Population growth continues to increase sharply, particularly in 
urban areas and, the AIDS epidemic notwithstanding, the youthful 
profile of demographics in Southern African means that scarce 
resources will be stretched to - and beyond - their limits as the 
millennium approaches. South Africa has a current population growth 
rate of approximately 2.2%: at this rate, its population by the 
year 2000 is projected to have increased to about 47 million from 
about 38 million at present.w 
M Calland and Weld, "Multilateralism, Southern Africa and 
the Postmodern World", 1994; p. 4. 
~ J.N. Garba (ed.), Towards Sustainable Peace and Stability 
in Southern Africa, New York: Institute of International 
Education, 1994; p. 30. 
68 Alan Whiteside, "Aids and its impact on the economic, 
social and political environment", in Minnie· Venter ·(ed.), 
Prospects for Progress: Critical Choices for Southern Africa, 
Cape Town: Maskew Miller Longman, 1994; p. 237. 
H ibid., p. 237. 
70 ibid. I P• 238. 
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Urbanisation is another powerful force at work changing the sub-
continent. In 1960 only one town in Sub-Saharan Africa, excluding 
South Africa, had a population of more than one million people. By 
1980 there were fourteen, and it is estimated that by the year 2000 
there will be 45. 71 Social problems - crime; poverty; homelessness 
- will grow with these figures. 
(Post)Modern Security Problems: Illegal Immigration 
Two problems in particular connect these trends, sharpening the 
security - and security thinking - crisis facing South Africa and 
the region. One is illegal immigration. As the region's obvious 
'honeypot', South Africa is a magnet for the region's swelling 
underclass. In July 1994 Finance Week claimed that "hundreds of 
thousands of illegal immigrants" were working in South Africa. 72 
In September 1994, the Financial Mail revealed more startling 
statistics: that 5-8% of South Africa's population is made up of 
illegals, and it could cost more than R210m, a tenth of the entire 
amount budgeted for the RDP, "just to house, educate, police and 
give medical care to only one sector of the problem: the illegal 
Mozambicans". 73 They are estimated to number anywhere from 500, 000 
to two million.~ 
South Africa's Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad observed matter 
of factly, "given that our borders are·so big, we will not be able 
to prevent it". 75 And yet, the cost of repatriating those that are 
caught ( 80, 000 in 1993) was expected to reach R120m for 1994, "and 
71 David Dewar, "Urbanisation patterns and policies in 
Southern Africa", in Venter (ed.), 1994; p. 279. 
72 Finance Week, July 7-11, 1994; p. 22. 
73 
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p. 22. 
74 ibid., p. 22. 
75 Interview in the Sunday Times, June 19, 1994. 
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"could reach R500m a year by the end of the century". 76 
This produces very difficult questions about whose security and 
whose region is at stake. Can South Africa be secure, through any 
means, in a decaying region? What do 'stringent influx control', 
an electric fence, and commando-style border patrols say about the 
'new', open and democratic South Africa? Says Deputy President 
Thabo Mbeki of the growing xenophobia toward illegal immigrants: 
You cannot deal with the future of the Southern African region 
on this kind of identification. Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Botswana 
and the other countries to which we fled in the 1960's did not 
call us illegal aliens. We must ask ourselves what we as South 
Africans can do, so that they can say "I'm going home". 77 
In this vein, the ANC's Reconstruction and Development Programme 
states: 
in the long run sustainable reconstruction and development in 
South Africa requires sustainable reconstruction and 
development in Southern Africa as a whole. Otherwise, the 
region will face continued high unemployment and 
underemployment, leading to labour migration and brain drain 
to the more industrialised areas. The democratic government 
must negotiate with neighbouring countries to forge an 
equitable and mutually beneficial programme of increasing 
cooperation, coordination and integration appropriate to the 
conditions of the region.n 
Yet, noble posturing toward the region will not alleviate South 
Africa's immediate dilemmas. There is a significant time lag 
between the spontaneous crises that regional decay is now bringing 
to South Africa, and the amount of time it will take to make those 
homes - whether in Angola, Mozambique or Zambia - worth returning 
to. Changed thinking is a start, and a major one; but that will not 
ease the agony of making decisions in the short-term. How, for 
76 ibid.' p. 22. 
77 The Star, October 13, 1994; in Vale, "Of Laagers, Lepers 
and Leanness", 1994; p. 37. 
78 African National Congress, Reconstruction and Development 
Programme, Johannesburg: Umanyano Publications, 1994; p. 116. 
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example, do unemployed South Africans feel about losing job 
opportunities to non-South Africans? Do they feel a regional 
'kinship'? Where is the line between generosity and pragmatic 
policy? Is "good welfare for all", as Bill Sass of the Institute 
for Defence Policy argues, only possible if the country is "secure, 
safe and stable"?D 
crime, Drugs and Guns 
A second issue that illustrates why fresh thinking on security is 
so important is the vicious crime-drugs-guns circle. One newspaper 
reported in January 1995 that "South Africa is facing a total 
onslaught by ruthless crime syndicates which is threatening to 
sweep the country over the brink into anarchy". 80 A related article 
in the same paper claimed that "Cape Town is a springboard for 
international drug trafficking" and that the city "is regarded as 
the mandrax consumer capital of the world". 81 
Lawlessness and drug trafficking, not surprisingly, are connected 
with illegal immigration, which brings home the full meaning of a 
border less region facing difficult times. One police colonel 
estimates that 14% of general crime involves illegal aliens. 82 
"Their shadowy status", writes the Financial Mail, "makes them 
ideal lackeys for crime syndicates" like the Chinese triads, who 
are estimated to have an annual turnover in South Africa of 
R200m. 83 
79 Bill Sass, "A Security Policy", Indicator SA, Spring 1994; 
p. 20. 
80 
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Gun running and weapon proliferation in the region complete this 
grim circle. The region's many bloody conflicts saw weapons pour 
in from outside sponsors; as economies and societies now lie 
battered, weapons are sold to those who are desperate enough to use 
them, and ex-combatants often turn, for lack of other 
opportunities, to crime. And yet, arms continue to be manufactured 
in South Africa and are sold with the apparent consent of the 
government. 
At the centre of this debate is Armscor. Can the government of the 
new' South Africa, after what the country has fought to overcome, 
condone or turn a blind eye to weapons manufacturing and trade? The 
government of national unity has decided, as a guideline to arms 
exports, to consider "whether the armaments could be used to 
suppress the local population, minorities or be used by 
insurgents". 84 What is really required, offers The Sowetan, "is a 
serious national debate on whether this country, after all that is 
has gone through, should be selling arms at all". 
The Weekly Mail had this to say: 
One can reasonably ask whether the board of Armscor, and other 
top officials steeped in the "total onslaught" culture, should 
continue to bear the awesome responsibility of regulating 
South Africa's arms industry.~ 
In fact, a confidential memorandum released in December, showed 
just how extensive Armscor' s range of clients has been, from 
military dictatorships like Haiti, to countries on the brink of 
civil war such as Somalia and Sudan, and to Warsaw Pact countries. 
It even supplied both sides of the civil conflict in Burma.u The 
document, according to one international affairs specialist, "is 
.
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an embarrassment to Armscor and, indeed, to Foreign Affairs. It 
seems to reveal a lack of geographical understanding and of 
politics". 87 
Yet curtailing Armscor's activities, as many would suggest, will 
not be easy. Both old style security thinking and powerful economic 
interests stand in the way. Take an Armscor advertisement for 
example: "The bee has a sting for its protection. south Africa has 
one too. Armscor: Creating wealth. Protecting the nation". As a 
large employer and an exporter, Armscor' s value to the economy 
cannot be dismissed lightly. Reflecting the difficulty these trade-
offs present, an ANC Department of Economic Planning report says: 
The future of the arms industry is not a foregone conclusion. 
At the end of the day all the arguments about cost-benefit 
analysis, the impact on trade and international relations, and 
the effect on the moral fibre of our nation will play an 
equally decisive role in the direction that we as a nation 
choose. Do we support an arms industry because it says it can 
create wealth and thus provide finance for social programs or 
do we spend money directly on the urgently needed social 
programs? This dilemma is yet to be resolved". 88 
Whichever way this debate tilts, one conclusion can probably be 
made: until the major economic and political interests begin to see 
the country's and the region's security as inextricably linked and 
socio-economically bound, effective security will be elusive. 
87 
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IV. South Africa and the Region: "Us and Them" or "Us and Us"? 
It is no surprise that regional issues will be framed by 
development needs, nor that South Africa's transition is seen as 
a great impetus to resolving common problems. Nonetheless, regional 
matters in the post-apartheid era will be delicate. Many different 
visions of South Africa's regional role have been aired, reflecting 
various internal and external interests. Some advocate a laissez-
faire, market economy approach to regional development; others 
support full regional economic integration; some favor political 
integration ahead of economic; and some would just as soon "get our 
own house in order first". Given the range of these positions, as 
well as its historical and emotional ties to the region, South 
Africa will thus have to be nimble in its approach to its 
neighbours. 
Some in the region are already wondering aloud about a new age of 
hegemony in Southern Africa, dawning with a rejuvenated market 
economy south of the Limpopo. Their anxiety is fully justified. 
South Africa's population is about one-third of the region's; South 
Africa produces 75% of the region's GNP, and its per capita GNP is 
almost two-and-a-half times that of the regional mean. By way of 
individual comparison, South Africa's economy is twenty five times 
larger than Tanzania's; its GNP per capita is US $2560 compared to 
Mozambique's $80 and Malawi's $230 - while only two countries, 
Namibia and Botswana, have figures above $1000.~ 
The dangers of 'bigism' are at least recognised by South Africa's 
policy makers. Isolating itself from the region is widely seen as 
a 'non-option', given South Africa's obvious interlinkages with its 
neighbours. And there is widespread acknowledgement that it is not 
89 Venter (ed.), Prospects for Progress: Critical Choices for 
Southern Africa, 1994; p. 304. 
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enough either for South Africa's wealth to merely 'trickle down' 
to the region. The ANC in particular has shown appreciation of 
these fears, declaring its intention 
to renounce all hegemonic ambitions in the region. (South 
Africa) should resist all pressure to become the "regional 
power" at the expense of the rest of the sub-continent; 
instead, it should seek to become part of a movement to create 
a new form of economic interaction in Southern Africa based 
on principles of mutual benefit and interdependence.~ 
But progress has stalled at the acknowledgement that action, of 
some kind, is required. There has been relatively little movement, 
for instance, toward a concrete regional development plan. At the 
heart of this inaction (on the South African side), it seems, is 
uncertainty as to what role the South African state should play in 
regional development. Should it push for greater economic 
integration among the region's countries? Or should its thrust be 
more political, in search of common understandings between regional 
leaders? Which methods will lead to more successful regional 
development, and greater prosperity and security for South Africa? 
And which is possible given the available resources? 
Regional organisations 
Already there exist several regional organisations whose primary 
purposes focus on economic cooperation.· The Preferential Trade Area 
(PTA), now called COMESA (Community of Eastern and Southern Africa) 
was formed in 1982 among nineteen states as a first step toward the 
creation of a common market. It has been weakened immeasurably 
however, by its unwieldy size; a lack of common interest; a lack 
of flexibility and breadth; a lack of firm timetables; and the non-
enforceability of commitments. 91 The Southern African customs Union 
~ ·African National Congress, "Foreign Policy in a New 
Democratic South Africa", Johannesburg: ANC Department of 
International Affairs, 1993; p. 11. 
91 Calland and Weld, "Multilateralism, Southern Africa and 
the Postmodern World", 1994; p. 13. 
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(SACU) (South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland) has 
been described by Gavin Maasdorp and Alan Whiteside as the "obvious 
starting point" for the region to build on its strengths. 92 In this 
vein, suggests the African Development Bank, SACU should be 
redesigned to accommodate a wider common market or free trade area 
in the region. 93 In practice however, SACU has provided South 
African producers captive markets in other member countries, 
benefitting disproportionately the would-be hegemon. Even Maasdorp 
and Whiteside concede that any "deepening" of SACU's capacities 
toward a common market could not be extended beyond the present 
membership. 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is seen by most 
as the best positioned organisation to lead regional development. 
Yet, it has been relatively ineffective in the past, when it was 
primarily an economic support system among the Frontline States, 
against a dominant South Africa. Its transition to a post-apartheid 
raison d'etre also has been slow, and, here too, dominated by 
indecision as to what methodology should drive regional 
cooperation. As one analysis observes, "the evidence suggests that 
none of the regional organisations, as currently constituted, are 
sufficiently equipped to deal with the problems of the region". 94 
Furthermore, prevailing opinion and indeed, worldwide evidence 
suggests that 
only countries which are at roughly similar levels of 
industrial development, have competitive industrial sectors 
and have potential to develop complementary industrial 
sectors, should join together in an economic integration 
92 Gavin Maasdorp and Alan Whiteside, Rethinking Economic 
Cooperation in Southern Africa: Trade and Investment. 
Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 1993; p. 41. 
93 African Development Bank Report on "Economic Integration 
in Southern Africa", Abidjan, 1993. 
94 Calland and Weld, "Multilateralism, Southern Africa, and 
the Postmodern World", 1994; p. 17. 
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arrangement. 95 
Even in the European Community, whose member states all enjoy 
similar levels of economic development and political maturity, the 
creation of a single market and currency has been lengthy and 
problematic. Tom Ostergaard offers one assessment of why economic 
integration would be particularly difficult in Southern Africa: 
as the economies are overwhelmingly geared to supplying raw 
materials to overseas markets, the current economic 
interaction among the countries of the region is frivolous. 
Furthermore, the countries are generally poor, the economies 
stagnant, and class formation is limited. Finally, many of the 
countries are undergoing political crises and the states are 
still pre-occupied with nation-building.% 
What then are the alternatives to economic integration? The 
economies of Angola and Mozambique lie devastated after decades of 
war, Zambia and Zimbabwe are struggling with adjustment programs, 
and Malawi's economy is reeling from years of uneven development 
and government neglect. Making these homes worth living in will 
depend heavily on material upliftment. What will tie these and 
other countries together with South Africa in working toward 
equitable regionwide development? 
More Substantial Political cooperation? 
As a partial answer, there appears to be growing awareness that 
more substantial political cooperation in the region is needed to 
guide development initiatives. SADC itself recognises the need for 
regional political cooperation beyond, or as a foundation for, 
economic development. Its 1992 Windhoek Declaration outlined a 
renewed set of objectives: 
95 Gavin Maasdorp, "A New community of Nations", Indicator 
SA, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1992. 
% Tom Ostergaard, "Integration - What Relevance for Southern 
Africa" in B. Oden (ed.), Southern Africa After Apartheid: 
Regional Integration and External Resources. Uppsala: The 
Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1993; p. 27. 
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common economic, political, and social value 
systems ... enhancing .. democracy and good governance, respect 
for the rule of law and the guarantee of human rights, popular 
participation and alleviation of poverty ... and the 
strengthening (of) regional solidarity, peace and security, 
in order for the people of the region to live and work 
together in peace and harmony.~ 
The arguments for greater regional political cooperation, for 
"building a coherent regional spirit" on which to base development 
initiatives, are convincing. The political systems of the region 
are generally rudimentary and unstable; most regional governments 
do not enjoy entrenched norms of transparency and accountability, 
and many are plagued by corruption. Political instability, as 
witnessed elsewhere in Africa and in Latin America, bodes poorly 
for equitable development. As Diamond, Linz and Lipset remind us, 
"democracy may be recommended not only on moral grounds but as 
ultimately facilitating systemic stability, which in turn 
facilitates economic growth". 98 "Democracy", one member of the DFA 
said appositely, "cultivates similar ways of thinking about 
things" . 99 
Facilitating the spread and maturity of regional democracy may 
therefore be a good starting point for South Africa. A recent study 
of regional issues concluded that "upon such a foundation important 
initiatives (economic, among others) may be placed". 100 At the very 
least, political agreements will have to be reached if the doubts 
in the region about South Africa's post-apartheid intentions are 
to be alleviated. A key to this approach for South Africa will be 
developing a sense of "followership" in the region through policy 
97 Treaty of the Southern Africa Development Community, 
August 1992 (adopted at the SADC Summit, Windhoek). 
98 Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, 
Politics in Developing Countries, 1990; p. 5. 
99 Interviews at the DFA, May 1994. 
100 Calland and Weld, "Multilateralism, Southern Africa and 
the Postmodern World", 1994; p. 12. 
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options "which allow South Africa to lead without dominating". 101 
Several possibilities present themselves. One suggestion is that 
South Africa can provide direction in the region by creating a "new 
morality" based on sensitivity to the needs of other countries . 102 
This is based partially on the recognition that apartheid 
underdeveloped not only South Africa but also the region. In the 
past, the region's destabilising forces originated in South Africa; 
now, there is opportunity for constructive forces to emanate from 
the country. This might be advanced by initiating a regional 
security regime, beginning with a body to monitor gun-running and 
the arms trade; and a regionwide Court of Human Rights which would 
help create a culture of human rights in the region and promote 
common standards and values among member countries. 103 
Another suggestion is that South Africa can lead a drive towards 
a renewed SADC, proposing an additional political tier to the 
organisation - in effect, giving economic development a guiding 
political hand. Ultimately, given the clear need for regional 
development amidst vastly unequal economies and significant 
political instability, steps toward political cooperation among the 
region's leaders - even their parliamentarians - could prove to be 
an indispensable foundation. 
As with security issues, regional cooperation will be framed by the 
extent to which South African policy recognises the region's 
complex interlinkages. Mozambique's development woes have been, and 
will continue to be, problematic for South Africa in many policy 
areas: foreign policy to be sure, but also in domestic areas like 
education, health, housing, and policing. Zimbabwe's struggling 
democracy will not only force malcontents southward but will also 
create political friction between a decreasingly accountable 
101 • b. d 1 1 • ' p. 21. 
102 Interview, Dr. Robert Davies, MP (ANC), August 3, 1994. 
103 See Calland and Weld, "Multilateralism, Southern Africa 
and the Postmodern World" for additional policy options. 
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government there and South Africa's new democracy. And as long as 
Angola's conflict lasts, meaningful regionwide development will be 
put on hold. 
Ultimately, the key to approaching regional policy is the idea that 
foreign and domestic policies are increasingly linked. South 
Africa's regional development strategies - or lack thereof - will 
profoundly affect its ability to deliver effective education, 
health care and housing to its own citizens. Seeing the region in 
these terms, it may turn out, is among the wisest interpretations 
of the country's 'national objectives'. 
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v. Fashioning a Global Identity: What Kind of Links? 
As South Africa creates its regional policy it will also be 
fashioning a new global image, albeit under very different terms. 
On the global stage South Africa will be the junior partner in most 
relationships, an aspiring but struggling 'middle power' in a world 
economy dominated by heavyweights. It will need therefore, to 
proceed carefully and with even greater circumspection than in the 
region: at the region's crossroads South Africa will be in a 
position to call the shots, whereas the global transition is being 
managed by others and South Africa will wield relatively little 
leverage. 
With the shift in international power away from the gee-political 
and the military, economic decisions on the global stage are 
increasingly important for any country and are more and more part 
of foreign policy. 'Maximising global linkages' for a country like 
South Africa is now primarily an economic endeavour. 
An ANC foreign policy discussion paper acknowledges that 
trade and investment issues should be a cornerstone of our 
foreign policy ... Gaining access to international know-how and 
new technology through participating in global trading and 
investment becomes a primary goal of our diplomacy". 104 
But for a middle or small power, the post bi-polar world is a 
tougher place than its predecessor. Whereas in the past, political 
alliance often brought economic favors, today's global marketplace 
gives no such rewards. Ten years ago, for example, a democratic 
South Africa might have been rewarded with favorable· market 
conditions for its goods in western countries. Today, it will be 
104 African National Congress, "Foreign Policy in a New 
Democratic South Africa", October 1993; p. 19. 
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granted few favors as it competes in a ruthless global economy with 
other emerging markets. 
Defining an appropriate role for the state in faciltating global 
links will thus be critical. What level of government involvement 
is desirable and from whose point of view? Excessive state 
regulation, national ownership, and huge state bureaucracies, for 
instance, are well known for driving away international 
participation. On the other hand, the free market, when left alone, 
is a notably poor distributor of resources. The ANC argues that: 
reconstruction and development will be achieved through the 
leading and enabling role of the state, a thriving private 
sector, and active involvement by all sectors of civil society 
which in combination will lead to sustainable growth. 105 
Where, as a leader and an enabler, does the state intervene - to 
ensure positive global linkages and to minimise negative ones - and 
how does it do it? 
As with security issues and regional development, making the most 
of global economic links will be complicated by the lingering 
uncertainties of domestic and global transition. What role will the 
state settle into? Which issues will help define the country's 
global links? What interests will emerge? A summary outline is 
provided below: 
* Courting foreign investment and establishing appropriate 
guidelines for foreign firms operating in South Africa will be one 
such defining issue. The hostility that greeted transnational 
companies in many host companies in the 1970's and 1980's is now 
seen to have been excessive and mistaken. 1~ Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is widely acknowledged as a critical part of any 
tm African National Congress, The Reconstructiori and 
Development Programme, 1994; p. 78. 
1~ Xavier Carim, "Some Trends in Foreign Direct Investment: 
Implications for South Africa", Working Paper Series, June 1994, 
Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western 
Cape; p. 2. 
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developing country's growth. A paper prepared by the UN Centre on 
Transnational Corporations summarises current attitudes toward 
TNC's and FDI: 
not many developing countries would now see the activities of 
TNC's as a threat to their sovereignty. (Some) countries .. have 
been able to take advantage of TNC investment to increase 
employment, exports and government revenues, to improve living 
standards, and even to enhance their own national economic 
power. In particular, TNC inward investment, correctly 
handled, has proven to be an effective way of enhancing 
domestic management capacity and technological skills. 100 
Yet, 'correctly handling' TNC's and investment is not always, or 
ever, straightforward. Foreign investors are usually not beholden 
to any of the host country's national objectives and their profits 
are not always profits for the host country. They are usually 
opposed by a variety of domestic interest groups, especially trade 
unions. And lately, especially within the Uruguay Round of the 
GATT, TNC's have increased their efforts to restrict access to 
their technology, protecting their "intellectual property", and 
reflecting their desire "to exploit the fruits of their research 
and development more effectively". 108 The often competing goals of 
foreign investors and the host country suggest, one analyst says, 
the need for a "pragmatic and nuanced approach which recognises the 
diverse impact of TNC's on the host country and one that promotes 
active bargaining - and regulation of - TNC's to improve benefits 
for the host nation" . 109 
Such a strategy could include arrangements concerning tax breaks, 
exchange controls, and in general an investor-friendly, stable 
macroeconomy provided by the host country; in return for labor 
training programmes, partnerships and joint ventures with black 
lITT 'b'd l l ., p. 3. 
108 Alan Hirsch, "How to Attract Foreign Investment", Trade 
Policy Monitoring Project, University of Cape Town, May 1993; p. 
3. 
109 Carim, "Some Trends in Foreign Direct Investment: 
Implications for South Africa", 1994; p. 5. 
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busin~sses, and in-country research and development sites offered 
by the international investor. It may also include such tradeoffs 
as assuring a foreign investor minimal trade union activity in a 
particular sector in return for a sizeable investment. Above all, 
the state should balance its role as the custodian of national 
objectives with the need to attract capital and investment through 
a market-friendly economy. 
In short, economic benefit is now the most important criterion in 
attracting foreign investment. In a world free of cumbersome geo-
political alliances, international investors have a far more 
expansive array of investment options, and emerging markets are now 
in greater competition for a limited amount of capital. This 
reality highlights the importance of a transparent and friendly 
investor policy, on top of a growing economy - as Heinz CEO and 
Argus newspaper magnate Tony O'Reilly observes, nobody yet is 
"breaking his neck to invest in South Africa. However noble they 
are, they have to protect their bottom line 11 • 110 
* It is equally, if not more, important, as Theodore Moran's work 
on TNC's in Chile shows, to analyse external linkages 
as the outcome of the interplay of domestic groups trying to 
maximize their own particular interests as well as the larger 
national interest.m 
It is no surprise, for example, that the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (Cosatu) vehemently opposes "the current trend of 
dogmatic adherence to rapid unplanned trade liberalisation" as it 
does also the "sale of any state assets which would impact 
negatively on the RDP". 112 Its continuing commitment to national 
110 David Weld, "SA will determine its own future", Cape 
Times, October 10, 1994. 
111 Theodore H. Moran, Multinational Corporations and the 
Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1974; p. 154. 
112 Sam Shilowa, Cosatu General Secretary, "RDP is the base", 
Finance Week, January 5-11, 1995; p. 11. 
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ownership however, pits it against a strong ANC-led faction in 
government which is increasingly serious about privatisation. 
Deputy President Thabo Mbeki revealed plans in mid-February for the 
partial privatisation, or "re-organisation" of state assets. 113 
Equally predictable in this framework of competing domestic 
interests, is the general business view that, as Robert Schrire 
puts it, "if the Government is to deliver its promises to its key 
constituencies, it has to be fully incorporated into the global 
political economy" . 114 
These contending viewpoints highlight what political analyst Steven 
Friedman suggests will become the new "order of the day": deals cut 
outside parliament made by the ANC, not with other political 
parties, but with important interest groups and most of all with 
organised business . 115 As the Financial Mail paraphrases, "these 
interest groups were phantoms at the Kempton Park opera, since only 
politicians came on stage there. But behind them are ranged the 
foreign industrialists who are potential investors in South 
Africa" . 116 
Yet, the outcomes of these deals and contests will likely remain 
uncertain in the near future as interests adapt to the new domestic 
order and dividing lines on many issues are blurred. It is still 
often difficult to distinguish between rhetoric and substance, 
especially within the business, government, labor triangle. For 
example, few would actually advocate what Cosatu calls 'rapid 
unplanned' trade liberalisation. But what about 'slow, planned 
trade liberalisation', or the sale of state assets which impacts 
113 Weekend Argus Business, "Its 'Go' for State sell-offs", 
February 18, 1995; p. 1. 
114 Robert Schrire, "Bumbling Along", Indicator SA, Spring 
1994; p. 10. 
115 Steven Friedman and Doreen Atkinson, The.Small Miracle: 
South Africa's Negotiated Settlement, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 
1995. 
116 Radford Jordan, "Charisma is not vision", Financial Mail, 
February 3, 1995; p. 47. 
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positively, rather than negatively, on the RDP? Such policies are 
widely seen as 'pragmatic' and Cosatu will not likely so strongly 
oppose them - especially when they are offered by its erstwhile ANC 
allies in government. Meanwhile, Deputy President Mbeki has added 
a populist tinge to privatisation, in effect covering his 'left' 
flank by suggesting methods which "could also facilitate the 
empowerment of disadvantaged sectors": 
Companies need not just be sold off to the highest bidder. 
Eastern Europe has shown how such sales can be used as a 
populist exercise. Shares could be reserved, say, for black 
insurance companies or trade-union pension funds, or sold 
directly to individual small investors. 117 
The underlying point is that dividing lines on many domestic 
contests have not yet solidified, something many foreign investors 
say must happen before they enter the market. Lingering domestic 
uncertainty thus can forestall investment (and along with it 
consistent economic growth) , a possibility that further underscores 
the interlinkage of domestic and foreign affairs. 
• Creating a transparent trade regime that enhances the flow of 
capital, technology and skills will be another key issue. In terms 
of South Africa's offer to the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs (GATT), it is committed to reducing tariff barriers to no 
more than 3 0%, or a third of present levels. 118 This, Anglo 
American Executive Director Bobby Gods el 1 acknowledges, "poses 
probably the most fundamental competitiveness challenge industry 
here has faced this century". 119 
It will be a challenge to more than just industry. As the country 
opens up to the world economy, uncompetitive firms will no longer 
survive as they once did. Some South Africans will lose jobs, 
others will find jobs harder to come by. Business and trade unions 
117 The Economist, "For Sale", November 5, 19.95; p. 45. 
118 Bobby Godsell, "New Challenges", Indicator SA, Spring, 
1994; p .. 17. 
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will see tariff reductions differently, as in general will the 
'haves' and the 'have-nots'; joining the world economy may be seen 
in some quarters as a sell-out to 'the people'. But, the head of 
the World Bank mission in South Africa, Isaac Sam, put it this way: 
openness transmits technology and generates economic growth 
among nations. Many developing nations have been successful 
at borrowing proven technology and exploiting linkages with 
more advanced industrial countries to become major players in 
world markets .•.. In fact, the supply of new technology for 
industrializing countries is largely determined by the degree 
to which they are integrated with the global economy. 120 
Maximising Global Linkages 
Early experience in the post bi-polar world indicates that most 
developing countries should expect to "pull themselves up by their 
own bootstraps". Advanced countries are now competing with each 
other economically more fiercely than before, and with gee-politics 
no longer a top issue poorer countries will be left to develop on 
their own. 
As South Africa begins its process of 'reconstruction and 
development' its economy has very little 'fresh' capital and it is 
competing for international investment with other emerging markets. 
It must seek to provide, much as countries like Singapore did and 
Thailand and Vietnam are now doing, a friendly environment for 
international investors and traders. Throughout this process, the 
state will need to define guidelines and balance competing interest 
groups both within the country and outside it. Crucially, the swift 
movement of the global market economy, the interlinkage between 
domestic and foreign policies, and its position as a semi-developed 
country in a tougher world, all mean that South Africa cannot 
afford missed chances to link with the global network. 
120 Isaac Sam, "The New Partnership", speech before the 
National African Federated Chamber of Commerce (NAFCOC) July 
1993. 
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CHAPTER III 
The Policy Framework 
I. Defining the Policy Framework 
Policy outcomes, especially in a democracy, are always subject to 
the imprecise and often unpredictable dynamics of policy making 
structures. Arnold Wolfers notes that, "emotions and subconscious 
impulses are involved no less than rational calculations, theories 
about the outside world no less than images of other actors, 
stereotypes and myths and obsessions no less than reasoned 
expectations and creativehypotheses 11 • .121 
A 'government of national unity' in particular gives rise to an 
exceptionally wide range of emotions, impulses, stereotypes and 
obsessions. Where else could long-time apartheid stalwarts be 
running government departments alongside former exiles? So, it 
makes sense to ask: How well equipped is South Africa's foreign 
policy framework to deal with the "double whammy"? What are the 
prospects of a coherent foreign policy emerging? 
But before these questions can be answered, the 'policy framework' 
121 Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962; p. 43. 
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itself must be defined and another round of question must be asked. 
In a more interdependent, interconnected world, foreign policy has 
moved away from the realm of politics and traditional diplomacy 
toward economic, environmental, social and other various issues 
that now connect people and states more than before. South Africa's 
new Labour Minister, for example, is vitally involved in foreign 
policy, as is the Minister of Trade and Industry. The Eastern 
Transvaal Premier recently held talks with the Mozambican 
government in an effort to stem the immigration tide from that 
country across his province's borders. What is now left for a 
Department of Foreign Affairs is a smaller slice of the foreign 
policy pie. 
How are the activities of various departments that participate in 
foreign policy to be coordinated? How will different interests be 
accommodated and prioritised. As with previous chapters, this one 
does not attempt answers. Its purpose is to provide policy makers 
and analysts with a menu of choices. The last chapter discussed 
three major policy issues. This chapter presents the parameters in 
which foreign policy debates and key decisions on these and other 
issues will be played out and considers the prospects for a 
coherent policy emerging. 
II. Foreign Policy and civil society 
In many democracies, an important part of such a policy framework 
is the various pressure groups outside the state that represent 
well-informed segments of society and which lobby for specific 
policies. Consider, for example, the role of The National 
Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP) or 
Randall Robinson's Transafrica in swaying the United States 
government to impose sanctions on south Africa. As is the benefit 
of a vibrant civil society, pressure groups can often bring their 
interests to bear on policymaking. 
In South Africa however, civil society is rebuilding and interest 
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groups are still defining their priorities as the political 
landscape stabilises. Though it is clear that interests have 
changed and re-ordered, it is unclear which will now be pre-
eminent. In the past white interests came before black, capital 
came before labour, and agriculture was given preference to 
industry. Now, though organised labor may have far more influence 
on policy than before, as do 'black interests' in general, most 
groups have been slow to perceive exactly where their interests lie 
and how to most effectively organise around key issues. 
Cosatu provides a good example. It is opposed to "rapid unplanned 
trade liberalisation", but where does it stand on gradually 
reducing barriers, slowly joining the world economy, and gaining 
international technology, all of which are widely seen as necessary 
steps if a growing economy is to be achieved and popular demands 
are to be met? As with the wider ANC alliance, Cosatu is struggling 
to redefine its liberation movement ethos to fit a more responsible 
society-building role; and as with its former allies now in 
government it is also struggling to maintain and redefine its 
constituency. Business interests, meanwhile, have maintained much 
of their influence by aligning themselves with segments of the ANC 
ruling elite. 
In short, though the terrain on foreign policy issues is now 
contested, as in other policy areas,· by a new range of public 
concerns, it is far from clear that those interests which are 
'newly empowered' will emerge victorious. South African politics 
remains very fluid: positions are forming and reforming, new lines 
are being drawn and new interests are emerging. It takes time for 
public groups to acclimate to a changed and still uncertain 
political arena, to perceive where their interests are, and to 
apply pressure for specific policies. 
These transitional bumps in the road are made acute by the fact 
that no clear mandate exists on foreign policy issues. Unlike 
housing, education or health care, where the livelihood of millions 
of South Africans depends on government delivery, foreign policy 
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decisions contain few direct, tangible influences. This is combined 
with the fact that international issues over the past five decades 
found very little interest or understanding among the South African 
public. The narrow limits of apartheid defined and dominated South 
Africa's worldview, its advocates defending the system to the 
world, and its opponents mobilizing international opinion against 
it. Only a very small cadre of individuals - some in government and 
the liberation movements, and the others, a limited group of 
academics and a segment of the media - were thinking about 
international issues, and then only as these issues were defined 
by the struggle to either defend or end apartheid. Outside of these 
efforts, relatively little thought was generated about world 
affairs. As Peter Vale says, "understanding and interpreting the 
world are not established South African pastimes" . 122 
This paucity of thinking on international affairs bodes poorly for 
widespread societal debate and public scrutiny of policy making. 
It means that until such education and media efforts can heighten 
public awareness, foreign policy debates will take place primarily 
within the confines of the state. 
III. Transition and the Department of Foreign Affairs 
Within the state, the DFA will be ·one player among several 
conducting foreign policy. Foreign policy issues, more than before, 
now encompass the activities of many different departments, and 
segments within them, and a wider range of competing interests will 
thus be brought to the fore. The Department of Defence, for 
instance, will be more likely to advocate a hard-line approach to 
regional issues, while Foreign Affairs may take a broader view. 
Likewise, the Labor Ministry will see investment issues and 
tradeoffs differently than the Ministry of Trade and Industry. In 
the context of South Africa's fluid political landscape, many of 
these positions and interests are still unclear. The ability of the 
122 Vale, "Of Laagers, Lepers, and Leanness", 1994; p. 8. 
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DFA therefore, to adapt to a new, more consultative, delierative 
role will be a crucial element in the emergence of coherent policy. 
This transition will depend heavily on itsability to merge into 
its new ranks opposing international traditions - the "upstairs" 
and the "downstairs" of South Africa's international experience. 123 
In the apartheid era, while the government was conducting official 
- ·upstairs - foreign policy, the liberation movements, notably the 
ANC and the PAC, conducted their own form of international 
relations, the downstairs, specifically geared to sway 
international opinion against the apartheid government. Two 
separate foreign policies were in motion, each with divergent 
methodologies emanating from vastly different 'South African' 
experiences. Official policy used closed-door, behind-the-scenes, 
and almost exclusively bi-lateral strategies; while the liberation 
movements, particularly the ANC, practised an open and multilateral 
approach. Government policy was staunchly anti-communist; 
"downstairs" policy found its most reliable allies in the Marxist-
Leninist world. 
The dual process of South Africa's diplomatic history has been 
masked, Peter Vale suggests, by the conventional understanding that 
foreign relations is mostly about governments - in fact, "it is 
chiefly about relations between people" . 124 As these two 
traditions now merge under the provisions of South Africa's interim 
constitution, which preserves the continuation of public servant 
posts, each brings to the table vastly different world views, 
methodologies and histories. The level of consensus that is 
achieved between them therefore, will determine the DFA's ability 
to reconceptualise South Africa's foreign relations. It is 
important therefore, to briefly describe each of them. 
123 Peter Vale, "Understanding the Upstairs and the 
Downstairs", 1993, unpublished mimeo. 
124 • b. d 3 l l ., p •• 
53 
The Upstairs 
Upstairs foreign relations was increasingly imprisoned by the 
domestic policy of apartheid. The South African state's well-
documented drift toward diplomatic isolation was inevitable as the 
National Party government steadily lost international 
recognition.us As a consequence it rarely had the opportunity to 
practice multilateral diplomacy. Though it maintained bilateral 
links with twenty countries, the intensity and warmth of these were 
mixed. 126 Relations with other pariah states, Chile and Israel for 
example, were warm, as they were with Taiwan. With the West, 
"upstairs" South Africa had an increasingly fractious relationship. 
Reagan's America and Thatcher's Britain saw South Africa to varying 
degrees as a buff er against the southward expansion of Marxism. But 
it is likely that "upstairs" policy makers overemphasised, or 
overplayed, South Africa's strategic value to the West. Much was 
made for example of the supposed importance of South African 
minerals, of the Cape sea route, and of the government's zealous 
anti-communism. In varying degrees at various times, these were 
important to the West; but leveraging these factors could not 
sustain a working relationship with the West as the deteriorating 
public situation became highly publicised. 
By the mid-1980's public opinion in the United States became the 
driving force behind the imposition of US sanctions against South 
Africa; and by 1989, twenty-seven percent of Britons boycotted all 
South African goods. 127 South Africa became the most isolated 
country on earth and the circles of "upstairs" foreign policy 
closed steadily inward. Downstairs diplomacy, as will be seen, can 
be credited with much of the leg-work around the drive for 
sanctions. 
125 ibid., p. 4. 
126 ibid., p. 4. 
127 ibid., p. 3. 
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African region, was no less narrow in focus, though it was more 
adventurist and indeed, militarist. Bi-lateral non-aggression pacts 
were made with Mozambique and Swaziland; the only other official 
relationship was with Malawi's dictator Kamuzu Banda. 128 From the 
mid-1970's onward, "the conduct of regional policy was the domain 
of South Africa's powerful mi 1 i tary" . 129 The concept of "forward-
def ence" lay behind what became known, infamously, as "Total 
Strategy" - a response to the alleged communist, "total", onslaught 
against South Africa being launched from neighbouring countries 
with the aid of northern benefactors. The result, Peter Vale 
writes, was that "by the mid-1980's, the distinction between 
"hawks" and "doves" in the making of regional policy had largely 
disappeared ... security issues began to crowd South Africa's foreign 
policy agenda". 1~ All part of Total Strategy were South Africa's 
support of Renamo in Mozambique, its 'reconnaissance' forays into 
Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and its military involvement in 
the Angolan conflict. 
The Downstairs 
It is a misconception - indeed, a gross oversight - to conclude 
that the state's history is the extent of South Africa's 
international experience. "Downstairs" diplomacy, writes one 
historian, "has a long, enduring history (which) is as old as that 
of the South African state; and in certain respects it has been a 
more successful history". 131 In 1909 a delegation from the Cape 
Colony and Natal visited London to protest the exclusion of the 
country's majority in the soon to be formed Union of South Africa; 
another delegation visited London in 1914 to protest the passing 
of the Land Act; and at Versailles, representatives of South 
128 ibid. I p. 4. 
129 ibid• I p. 5. 
130 ibid. I p. 5. 
131 Colin Bundy in Peter Vale, ibid. I p. 5. 
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Africa's disenfranchised sought to "reverse the entire trend of 
Native policy" . 132 By the end of World War II 
the formation of the United Nations and the deepening movement 
towards decolonisation placed the downstairs tradition on two 
tracks: internal resistance and external support. They were 
to feed upon each other in a dramatic fashion and would come 
to combine elements of political pressure, boycott, and a war 
of national liberation". 133 
Most important, downstairs links with Africa were extensive. In 
1960 the ANC established an external mission in Lesotho, the PAC 
one in Tanzania. Throughout the following decades downstairs exiles 
resided in guerilla camps and operated from missions all over 
Southern Africa; indeed, not an easy contribution for many home 
governments to make, especially Mozambique and Zimbabwe, when 
"upstairs" South Africa was so determined to prevent guerilla 
activity in the region. 134 
Downstairs diplomacy found its most significant achievements 
ironically, in the very West whose values the upstairs claimed to 
be defending. By the mid-1980's South Africa's exiled leadership 
enjoyed what amounted to a government-in-exile status in Europe and 
North America. The Anti-Apartheid Movement was a strident voice in 
every major Western capital. In the US, by 1991 "30 states, 120 
cities and 150 universities had passed sanctions laws against South 
Africa". 135 One ANC leader remarked of· these successes that, "we 
were never isolated, we could go almost anywhere; it was Pretoria 
that was shut out. 136 
At the core of these different diplomatic histories are vastly 
different approaches to the world. As the cancer of apartheid grew, 
132 ibid• I p. 5. 
133 ibid. I p. 6. 
134 ibid. I p. 7 
135 ibid. I p. 7. 
136 ibid. I p. 7. 
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the two fell more clearly on opposite sides of the historical 
process: the upstairs fervently, and finally frantically, trying 
to stem the rise of international opinion and action against 
apartheid; the downstairs marching inexorably forward in swaying 
international thinking. Upstairs policy gradually developed an 
insularism that increased with South Africa's pariah status. 
Foreign policy became a method of defence; security issues 
dominated strategy; and a 'beggar thy neighbours' approach was 
adopted, both economically and militarily, to ensure South African 
dominance in the region. Downstairs policy on the other hand 
developed an open approach; its cause became an international cause 
and it sought wide audiences; and there was a feeling that history 
would, in time, reward its efforts. 
Merging these traditions therefore presents several practical 
problems. For one, South Africa's interim constitution is ambiguous 
about the reorganisation of the civil service. Cl_ec:n:_:ly, effe_C'.ti ve 
new policies cannot be implem~~1:._ed by al! unchanged civil service; 
at the same time, the interim Constitution provides for serving 
public servants to continue in employment until such laws passed 
under the new Parliament change their status. 1n Most departments 
are therefore integrating new public servants with the old. At the 
DFA, for example, though 310 members of the ANC's DIA were to have 
been integrated within several months of the May 1994 inauguration, 
this process has proved far slower than expected. 138 
Furthermore, neither 
significant changes 
Understanding global 
tradition has really come to terms with the 
in the world in the past five years. 
trends was secondary to the intense dynamics 
of 'negotiating the revolution'. For most of the early 1990's, both 
sides used foreign policy, sanctions in particular, as a pawn in 
in Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Section 
236: "Transitional Arrangements: Public Administration". 
138 I was given this figure during a private interview at the 
DFA in May 1994; several months later, only a handful ANC DIA 
members had been integrated. 
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the domestic game. Peter Vale suggests that "both the upstairs and 
the downstairs were impoverished by their peculiar understandings 
of international relations and the unique ways in which they were 
forced to operate". The upstairs of course was bound more tightly 
by its excessively inward view; but the downstairs also was heavily 
focused on issues that concerned the immediate dismntling of 
apartheid. Even its more open approach provided its diplomats only 
limited multilateral experience. 
IV. some Defining Issues 
Several specific policy issues highlight the emotional and 
conceptual gaps between these merging traditions. Regional policy 
is one. Given their vastly divergent approaches to the region in 
the past, the degree to which the upstairs and downstairs can reach 
consensus regarding South Africa's neighbours will be critical. 
Clearly, regional policy is of special concern for the ANC. A 
foreign policy discussion paper says: 
we have a special relationship with the peoples of Southern 
Africa, all of whom have suffered under apartheid'. .. The region 
sustained us during our struggle and our destiny is 
intertwined with the region; our peoples belong with each 
other. Southern Africa is, therefore, a pillar upon which 
South Africa's foreign policy rests. 1~ 
The extent therefore, to which it can convince other elements of 
the foreign policy structure to follow its lead will be decisive. 
At a theoretical level there is some basis for optimism. Upstairs 
remnants at the DFA have been candid about the need to develop the 
region, some speaking of the need to hold "talk-shops aimed at 
developing better channels of communication", others of creating 
139 African National Congress, "Foreign Policy in a New 
Democratic South Africa", October 1993; p. 10. 
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"a more results-oriented form of regional multilateralism" . 140 In 
Parliament as well, members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
across the poli tial spectrum appear committed to the idea of 
regional development.wt 
In practice however, differences will arise. The upstairs portion 
of the DFA is more likely to advocate a cautious approach in the 
region, taking time to "get our own house in order first". It may 
also be more apt to resist forms of integration which would 
contractually bind South Africa, pref erring instead a more laissez-
f aire approach. This may be at odds with more activist downstairs 
proposals. But even the ANC is unsure, as a whole, what level of 
involvement and which methods are appropriate. As in other policy 
areas, there is a noticeable split in the organisation between 
"pragmatists" and "idealists", between those who see scarce 
resources as a limitation and those who see them as an 
inconvenience. Thus, the most noticeable aspect of the 'new' Soth 
Africa's regional policy, unfortunately, is a lack of vision from 
any section of the policy community. 
Illegal immigration will be another sensitive issue. The upstairs 
will be less inclined to see security in the inclusive, "us and 
us", manner of the term, and will likely push, as was suggested at 
the DFA, for more "stringent influx control" • 142 Because of its 
historic links with the region,_tbe downstair$~Wi],.l be less willing 
-------~------- --- --- -- ----- -
t9_act strongly against illegal immigratien. This raises important 
.--· ------- --
questions. How will policy makers weigh long-term goals like 
~j~ _ _with-sh_ort-ter-E!__Q!1_e_s_like st~!IlIDing_ <;:_r.ime_and 
~-i-ng~.ass_that_come_fr_q]!!__~under.dey_eloped:-r~gig_.n? How 
will the ANC balance its emotional sentiments with the 
practicalities of scarce resources and the responsibilities of 
governing? 
140 Interviews, DFA, May 1994. 
141 Interviews, Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
November 1994. 
wz Interview, DFA, May 1994. 
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I, . { .,_•~ ' lo"t e. ' (:; ,fiS ~' v:t J · 
Other issues will also test the eoheren.ce of the policy framework. 
South Africa's relations with Cuba, for one, has become the 
emotional bellwether for upstairs/downstairs relations. Does the 
new South Africa see Castro as an historic ally who made a valuable 
contribution to the fight against apartheid, and on these grounds 
support Cuba against the US blockade of the island? or, does South 
Africa sympathise with Cuba but be careful not to antagonise the 
United States? How does South Africa weigh offending the United 
States against offending Cuba? The prevailing downstairs view 
appears to be that 
South Africa should certainly stand by Cuba for old time'~s ,Ms-JI~ 
• \ JT•l->°'-\ ' " 
sake, out of an honorable acknowledgement of the immens 
contribution Cubans made to the struggle against apartheid. 
Morality, after all, should be a part foreign policy.M3 
But how far can morality take a foreign policy, especially in a 
post-Cold War, economically-driven world? Similarly, how should 
South Africa approach the delicate issue of relations with China 
/' and Taiwan? Here, China demands that South Afric~er __ diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan if it wants to establish them with China. The 
- -·~--- -~--~ - ------- --- - ~ 
lines on_ ~~is issue ~re also-drawn: the National Party is against 
breaking ties with Taiwan144 , wl:!h_who11l South Africa's trade was 
_..Y~lued at__.~4--2f>il_?.._~~n -~~-- 1993 comp_ari=d _ to_RJ.., .. .6bil_li_ol! _ Y!i_th 
C~ina145 ; while the ANC alliance appears to lean toward China. A 
document circulating in the foreign ministry earlier this year 
apparently showed "a clear and decisive swing away from Taipei 11146 , 
but this is in spite of a major Taiwanese effort - a "big sell" 
~ving_Eaid tr~E5- ~nd gifts for South African parliamentarians 
143 Jeremy Cronin, SACP Central Committee and ANC National 
Executive, "Morality is an integral part of a foreign policy", 
The star, August 1994. 
144 
"official National Party view", interview with B. L. 
Geldenhuys, MP (NP), Foreign Affairs Committee, November 3, _1994. 
145 Gaye Davis, "MP' s feted with Taiwan holidays", The Weekly 
Mail, February 3, 1994; p. 4. Statistics released by the 
Commissioner of Customs and Excise. 
146 Peter Vale, "A diplomatic dilemma: One China or the 
other?", The Weekly Mail, February 10, 1995; p. 28. 
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- to ensure its rela:tip_nship_wi th South Africa. 147 According to one 
~,___~~~~~~--~~~ 
SACP member, resolving the matter 
could only be through recognising China and maintaining a 
relationship with Taiwan on a largely economic basis ... It 
would be a coup for Taiwan if it succeeded in getting dual 
recognition or continued recognition.Ms 
Again, is there a 'moral' approach? How much can intense lobbying, 
both internal and external, shift preferences? 
Yet consensus on other issues may be a beacon for those in which 
the battle lines are still drawn. Consider the rapprochement over 
attitudes toward international financial institutions. As it has 
in domestic economics, the ANC has greatly moderated its view of 
international capital, reflecting new measures of pragmatism. As 
one member (DP) of the Foreign Affairs Committee said of his 
colleagues, "we have starting point differences rather than 
finishing point differences .. the reality of capital flow in our 
world necessitates a certain friendliness to market conditions 11 .M9 
South Africa has not, for example, joined Zimbabwe's harsh 
criticisms of the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank. 150 
This apparent consensus on a major policy issue is a positive 
indication that a coherent foreign policy framework may be 
emerging. But these are still early days. As intense exchanges on 
other issues like Cuba show, the upstairs and downstairs can still 
be miles apart. This highlights the reality that debates beyond the 
Cold War, apartheid-era matrix are still to come. 
--------------.,4i,.,...,.,,ilu w-t.r\.c-1"' .... t;\ r 
147 Davis, "MPs feted with Taiwan holidays", p. 4. 
148 Raymond Suttner, Chairman, Parliamentary Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, in Davis, "MP's feted with Taiwan holidays"; p. 
4. 
M9 Interview, Colin Eglin MP (DP), November 4, 1994. 
150 Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe blasted 
institutions in a speech before the South African Parliament 
year and urged South African to join Zimbabwe's criticism. 
/~ 
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the 
last 
v. Concluding Thoughts on the Policy Framework 
The jury on the emergence of an effective policy framework 
therefore, is still out. Public interests have not yet organised 
around specific issues to pressure state policy. As such, most 
debates will be left to government bureaucrats, themselves 
competing on new and still uncertain terrain. As Robert Schrire 
says, "public policy is rarely, if ever, based exclusively upon 
technocratic expertise and theoretical knowledge. Objectives such 
as getting re-elected, rewarding allies and punishing opponents are 
often more important in shaping policy than 'neutral' (economic) 
objectives" . 151 
Bureaucracies - and bureaucratic thinking - change slowly and South 
Africa's is no exception. New thinking may be optimal, but this 
will take time, and will be opposed by entrenched, protected 
interests; in the short term then, the ability of contending groups 
within the policy making structure to reach consensus and 
compromise on major issues will be of paramount importance. There 
are already indications general agreement on the need for 
regional development and for international (institutional) 
financial assistance are examples - that such agreement can be 
reached. 
More fundamentally, conceptual gaps between the "upstairs" and 
"downstairs" will only be resolved when foreign relations and the 
diplomatic service are de-politicized. To this end, an independent, 
non-partisan diplomatic training course or school should be 
established whose purpose would be to recruit South Africans of all 
backgrounds and prepare them for international service based on a 
151 Robert Schrire, Wealth or Poverty: Critical Choices for 
South Africa, Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1992; p. 7. 
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carefully constructed curriculum of the 'South African 
experience' . 152 Clearly, merging these traditions will only make 
real progress when their respective visions of South Africa and the 
world look more like one another, and this ultimately depends on 
the long-term levelling of the country's socio-economic 
inequalities. In the medium term such a school would help 
rationalise and re-structure the way South Africa's international 
leaders think about their country and the world. 
In the immediate term, policy makers should understand that foreign 
policy is a broader, and less easily managed undertaking than in 
the past - a collective public and private endeavor over which it 
has less and less direct control. Its crucial role will be as a 
coordinator and as a leader, providing both a direction and 
transparent policies for other actors to follow. 
152 Such a school was originally proposed at a 1992 
conference, "South Africa and the World: A New Vision" convened 
by the South African Institute of International Affairs and the 
Centre for Southern African Studies of the University of the 
Western Cape. 
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Chapter IV 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Reconceptualising South Africa's Foreign Relations: 
Prospects for the Future 
I. Facing the Challenge 
Two highly unusual and simultaneous events combine to make the 
final years of the twentieth century a particularly challenging 
period for South African foreign policy. The country's own 
negotiated revolution and the disintegration of the global bi-polar 
system have completely altered the context in which foreign policy 
is debated and indeed made. As traditional assumptions about South 
Africa and the world crumble away however, new parameters have been 
slow to emerge. Foreign policy debates in the 'new' South Africa 
have not yet moved into a post-apartheid, post-Cold War arena; the 
country's "upstairs" and "downstairs" traditions have not yet 
synthesised, let alone reconciled, their past experiences; and key 
public interests have not yet been pulled into the policy or 
'information' realm. 
As this paper has repeatedly argued, charting new territory for 
South Africa's foreign policy requires understanding the most 
important implications of both domestic and global change. How 
policy makers understand these dual transitions ultimately affects 
the options they perceive and the decisions they make. This 
concluding chapter summarises these changes and their implications 
and outlines several policies that will help build a 
reconceptualisation of south Africa's foreign policy. 
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Adapting to Global Trends 
New trends in the world have changed the way states and people 
interact. Liberal political and economic values have spread rapidly 
and have helped create the global marketplace, where goods, 
services and information are exchanged with growing ease. At the 
same time, new transnational security issues are replacing 
traditional state-centred paradigms. Thus, even as some forces are 
binding people together in unprecedented ways, others are 
fragmenting states and societies. 
For weak states, a rapidly changing and still uncertain world is 
a frightening place. The world economy in general, and tariff and 
trade rules and investment standards in particular, are governed 
by others, and states like South Africa will have little recourse 
on such issues but to adapt to global trends. In addition, with end 
of superpower competition, individual states in the developing 
world will be increasingly self-reliant in meeting defence 
requirements. For some states, often undemocratic ones, this will 
mean larger defense budgets. For many other states, including South 
Africa, political and social pressure against increasing defense 
expenditures means that security will have to be ensured in 
alternative, less costly ways. 
With these trends in the political and economic make-up of the 
world, most states will have to 're-invent' their foreign policies. 
The rise of economic and information-based power means that 
efficiency and productivity, rather than military brawn, will 
characterise tomorrow's successful societies. And because new 
security threats are predominantly transnational in character, 
individual states, on their own, will be less able to neutralise 
them. These changes should translate into the following policies 
for South Africa: 
* active participation in international disarmament and non-
proliferation talks, including the Nuclear Non-proliferation 
Treaty; 
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* efforts to strengthen international law and the World Court 
of Justice; 
* efforts to increase the UN's peacekeeping capacity, with a 
view in particular to giving it more military capabilities. 
These options allow South Africa to seek security collectively and 
minimise defense costs. President Mandela's moral leadership gives 
South Africa an opportunity to act with greater force and 
conviction than its status as a weak 'middle power' would otherwise 
allow it. Furthermore, foreign policy should explicitly recognise 
the economic power of private citizens, corporations, and non-
governmental agencies in the world marketplace by: 
* empowering domestic firms and individuals to tap into the 
global marketplace, as well as allowing international actors 
to operate efficiently in the domestic market; 
* " reducing barriers to international business transactions. The 
scrapping of the dual currency system is a positive signal, 
and should be followed by the gradual dismantling of exchange 
controls; 
* considering creative ways of making South Africa an attractive 
investment location for foreign funds. Seeking ways to 
minimise labour disputes and strike activity, perhaps in 
sectors specially pin-pointed for foreign investment, are 
short-term measures while improving productivity and training 
opportunities are important longer term goals. 
Amidst the uncertainty of global transition, it is clear that 
states and peoples will be increasingly connected, in both positive 
and negative ways, to their international surroundings. 
Understanding these linkages is a critical step toward re-inventing 
South Africa's foreign policy. 
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Building a Regional Foundation 
Regional relations will prove to be the most important - and so far 
have been the most vexing - aspect of South Africa's new foreign 
policy. One year ago, South Africa's re-entry into the 
international community was met with a great deal of enthusiasm in 
the region, mixed with a small dose of fear that South Africa would 
unfairly dominate regional relations. Unfortunately, pandering to 
these concerns has led to inaction at a time when the region has 
been crying out for leadership and vision. What, for example, has 
happened to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) since 
South Africa joined the organisation with great fanfare last 
August? And what progress has been made on illegal immigration, 
unarguably one of South Africa's and the region's greatest 
problems? Policy makers must recognise that South Africa has a 
unique opportunity to operate with flexibility and vision in the 
region. Unlike its position on the global stage, South Africa can 
call the shots here. It is therefore incumbent upon the government 
of national unity to develop a suitably visionary regional policy -
one that moves beyond the (sadly) often hollow calls for greater 
'regional cooperation'. Such a policy should be based on the 
following principles: 
* That security in the region is ine~tricably linked to 
development. A decaying region will place huge burdens on the 
livelihoods of South Africans; 
* That regional, not national, solutions should therefore be 
sought for major problems which countries of the region share, 
including crime, the drug-trade, gun-smuggling, and poverty 
and underdevelopment; 
* That regional political cooperation an 'aligning of 
mindsets' - is a critical foundation for these solutions, yet 
one that will be hollow without concrete mechanisms to 
alleviate real problems. Harmonising regional labor laws; 
coordinating regional energy needs and goals; building a 
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regional peacekeeping force; and protecting the region's 
natural resources are all initiatives that need consideration; 
* That governments should not dominate regional development 
initiatives but rather provide a framework within which 
private enterprise can operate. Regional governments should 
pave the way by reducing transaction barriers, minimising 
regulations and providing clear signals about the goals they 
envision; 
* That the region can make unique contributions to global 
debates on issues ranging from investment in developing 
economies and nature and wildlife conservation to preserving 
traditional forms of art and culture; 
* That the region as a whole, not simply South Africa, should 
be seen as a bridge to the rest of the continent; 
* That an adequate regional policy will be driven only by 
reconceptualising relationships between the region's states 
and their people; the role of government; and the meaning and 
methods of security. 
These principles will be tested on several issues, perhaps notably 
on illegal immigration. Another test ~ay come on the fate of a 
regional electricity grid which was recently proposed at a sub-
Saharan Oil and Minerals conference in Johannesburg. How fully 
policy makers envision the connection between regional 
electrification, development, and security; and in what ways they 
facilitate the operation of groups like Southern African 
Development through Electrification (Sadelec) will indicate the 
degree to which policy makers envision the interlinkages of a post-
Cold War, post-apartheid region. 
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Integrating Domestic Characteristics 
Forging a new international identity will also require new thinking 
about South Africa. As in the world around it, South Africa's 
political landscape is being transformed. Old assumptions no longer 
work. But new paradigms have been slow to emerge and foreign policy 
is caught, momentarily, in a void between the old and the new. This 
void is characterised, above all, by a society struggling to find 
common ground among its many components. 
To recall, domestic transition has been simultaneously dramatic and 
minimal. The change in government and executive leadership, the 
style and composition of Parliament, upliftment policies for the 
poor and previously disenfranchised, and society's new openness, 
are all major departures from the past. Yet, many other aspects of 
political society haven't changed. The civil service has remained 
intact, business and the private sector remain enormously powerful, 
and lifestyles for the well-off have generally been unaffected by 
political change. That change has not come to all areas of South 
African life equally, or at all, is neither entirely bad nor good; 
it means simply that South Africa remains a land of many 
differences, and therefore of many competing interests. As UWC 
professor Peter Vale reminds us, "South Africa has not a single, 
but multiple personality traits to the identity it seeks". 
Yet these traits require a basic level of cohesion and this, to 
simplify, is what post-apartheid foreign relations have so far 
lacked. The ANC and NP international traditions operate in 
completely different worlds; government, business and labor share 
few visions about South Africa and the world; and public interests 
remain largely uniformed and uninterested in international affairs. 
Erecting a 'big tent' under which all the various actors involved 
in foreign relations recognise similar points of reference, share 
similar assumptions, and are privy to the same information would 
therefore be the goals of the following: 
* The appointment of a National Foreign Relations Council, 
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headed by a Presidential Advisor, in the President's Office 
whose mandate would be to a.) coordinate foreign relations 
activities among various government departments, and b.) to 
serve as an in-house 'think-tank' for government foreign 
policy and strategy. Based on the US model, the appointment 
of such a Council would be the first step in reconceptualising 
foreign policy making as a much broader, far-reaching 
undertaking than in the past. The Council would be more 
flexible and multidisciplinary than the Department of Foreign 
Affairs (DFA) and would enable the country, via the 
President's office, to respond effectively to rapid changes 
in the world. 
Several elements of the current policy framework highlight the 
need for a more flexible, accountable strategising body. 
First, Deputy President Thabo Mbeki is widely seen to oversee 
the country's foreign policy, though behind closed doors. The 
Council would recognise that quick responses are best formed 
under the more extensive reaches of the (Deputy) President's 
Office (as opposed to the DFA), but that these policies must 
be accountable to the public. Such a Council would formalise 
the role of the President's Office in foreign policy, thereby 
opening the door to public scrutiny. 
Furthermore, the current juncture requires a complete 
reconceptualisation of South Africa's international identity, 
a task the DFA has so far undertaken with little enthusiasm. 
Part of the Council's mandate. would be to develop new 
strategies, principles and guidelines for South Africa's 
foreign relations, an undertaking for which the DFA, to be 
fair, is simply too unwieldy. 
* An information campaign to educate South Africans on global 
political and economic trends as well as on their own 
government's foreign policy. The campaign would be two-
pronged: first, the South African Institute·of International 
Affairs (SAIIA) should be reformulated as an information and 
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policy monitoring centre. Because it has traditionally been 
excluded from policy circles SAIIA has developed an insular 
approach to South Africa's foreign relations; a restructuring 
of the Institute should broaden its focus and give it a 
greater policy orientation. Much like the Institute for 
Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) acts as a link between the 
democratic process and the public by monitoring government 
policy, a renewed SAIIA would bridge a similar gap between 
international information and the South African public. 
Second, the government itself should also routinely brief key 
decision makers and opinion formers in the media, in labor, 
and in business through either newsletters or press 
conferences concerning the state's foreign policy. 
At the core of providing information about foreign policy and 
international affairs is the understanding that global events 
in so many ways affect daily, domestic lives. In a smaller, 
ever-interlinked world, re-educating South Africans about the 
world outside may be as important an endeavor as IDASA' s 
mission to bring democracy to the people. 
* The establishment of a university-level school for 
international and diplomatic training. It would specifically 
recruit students from all South African backgrounds and its 
curriculum would allow students to study and train overseas. 
such a school would seek to provide South Africa's future 
international leaders similar training and an opportunity to 
weave together many different 'South African experiences'. 
Foreign policy in South Africa suffers most from the limited circle 
of strategists and interests that influence policy. Unlike almost 
all other government departments in the 'new' South Africa, foreign 
policy has not yet become a public concern, and therefore the full 
breadth of South Africa's characteristics are not brought to bear 
on policy. Forging a new and truly South African international 
identity will thus only occur when new mechanism·s are created to 
widen the scope of foreign relations and the reach of international 
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information. 
South Africa: A Natural Peacebroker 
As policy makers seek stable ground amidst the shifting terrain, 
a natural step would be to consider South Africa's unique 
capacities for contribution in a 'new world order'. Above all, 
South Africa's transition has been hailed as a victory of rational 
moderation over skewed extremism. Negotiation, compromise and 
consensus building have been the hallmarks of a remarkable 
'revolution' , and have made South Africa a beacon of hope for 
democracy and economic revival in a world full of democratic and 
development failures. This standing, enhanced by the near universal 
respect in which the world holds its leader, provides South Africa 
a natural platform as a broker of international peace and goodwill. 
Policy makers should thus consider creating a permanent team of 
mediation experts made up of peace monitors, domestic activists, 
and community leaders to be sent to world trouble spots, 
particularly in Africa. With grass-roots experience in South 
Africa, such a team may be more appropriate and effective for 
conflicts like Rwanda than high-powered, Western-oriented 
diplomatic missions. 
As it has already done to some effect in Angola and Mozambique 
therefore, South Africa should continue to imbue old rivalries with 
fresh thinking. By pushing the right diplomatic buttons, South 
Africa should seek to maintain relations with Taiwan and establish 
them with Beijing. It should press Cuba on human rights, and urge 
dialogue with the United States, even while it opposes the US 
embargo. In the Middle East, South Africa should seek full 
diplomatic and economic relationships with both Israel and 
surrounding Arab states. In sum, South Africa has a vested interest 
in not choosing sides in the world's diplomatic arguments; but 
instead of passively playing the middle-of-the-road, South Africa 
has a unique opportunity to influence positive outcomes. Its own 
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transcendence of past differences carries enormous weight on the 
world stage, for the time being, and policy makers should use this 
dwindling asset to South Africa's, and the world's, benefit. 
concluding Remarks 
Recognising the opportunities that await a new foreign policy 
requires vision. Creating appropriate policy responses demands 
political will. It is perhaps understandable that these together 
have not yet permeated the policy framework, for the new South 
Africa's first year had more urgent requirements. But the grace 
period is drawing to a close. In a world where foreign and domestic 
affairs are so closely linked, South Africa cannot afford to keep 
blindly feeling its way through international relations. 
Like all other policy areas in the new South Africa, foreign policy 
suffers from the legacy of the past. Decisive, visionary action 
will only occur when fresh thinking about a 'new' South Africa in 
a 'new' world rises to challenge old routines and old mechanisms. 
This paper has sought to make a contribution towards this 
reconceptualisation. 
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